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CHAPTER  ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations estimates that 5,000 Eritreans leave their country every month as 
refugees. The Wall Street Journal recently referred to Eritrea as one of the "world's fastest-
emptying nations." Many of them are young men, and researchers (Italics not mine) 
on the ground have noted that the ages of Eritrean refugees have gotten progressively 
younger, suggesting that they are leaving before conscription.1   
The Washington Post, April 2016 
Migration research has mainly been focused on migration processes. As a result, most existing 
migration theories do not provide very specific concepts into the nature of migration effects on 
development in sending societies. Over the last four decades, migration impact on the development 
of migrant-sending countries has been the subject of constant and at times heated debate. From this 
debate, one can mainly distinguish two radically opposed methods, which is “balanced growth” 
versus “asymmetric development” theories. These differing views are often referred as “migration 
optimists” and “migration pessimists”. However, this debate has developed rather separately from 
the theoretical debate on the causes of migration. And this demonstrates, why the debate on 
migration and development has stalled, somehow undertheorized and mostly disconnected from 
more general debates.  
Examining the role of Eritrean refugees/immigrants in Norway in light of the homeland 
development sheds some light on the unsettled migration development debate. The study also 
contributes in broadening our theoretical knowledge on the role of refugee’s remittance in 
homeland development deliberations, an area largely unstudied. One other distinctive aspect of this 
research is the disposition on the migration development discourse linking integration with 
homeland development. Using samples, discussions are presented on how lack of integration could 
be problematic for both receiving and sending states.  
According to the Norwegian Statistics Bureau (SSB), in 2016 the overall number of Eritrean 
Norwegians including children born to Eritrean parents stands at 17,592. Out of this number 3,109 
                                                          
1 Max Bearak, “Hundreds of thousands have fled this country. This ghastly massacre is a reminder why”; available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/13/a-ghastly-massacre-in-eritrea-is-a-reminder-of-
why-so-many-are-fleeing/; site accessed 18 April 2016. 
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are Norwegians born to Eritrean parents, so-called second generation immigrants.2 From 2007 up 
to 2015, UDI statistics indicates18, 492 Eritreans claimed asylum in Norway.3 As the naturalization 
process could take more than eight years, those still living with a refugee status, and those resettled 
via family reunion, over the last seven years are excluded from the statistics. In this case, if we 
mathematically sum-up the numbers, presumably more than 35,000 Eritreans and Norwegians with 
Eritrean descent currently live in Norway.  
Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter discusses on the general introduction of the thesis. The second chapter deals with 
methodological issues in conducting the research. In the third chapter relevant theoretical literature 
on migration, homeland development and migration in light of poverty and conflict are reviewed. 
In the fourth chapter, relevant research on the background history to the Eritrean migration 
phenomena and Eritrean diaspora’s role in the homeland development endeavors are elaborated. 
  In the fifth chapter, discussions of migration in light of pull and push migration models 
and integration with the host society are presented. In the sixth chapter an analysis of the findings 
on the understanding and contribution of Eritrean refugees in Norway in the homeland 
development is surveyed. In the seventh chapter results of the main research findings are presented 
with a final reflection of the thesis.   
The State of Migration in Europe  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, marked the beginning of an end to the cold war period. 
Eventually, many European countries demolished borders, and the dream of borderless Europe 
materialized. However, a quarter of a century later, a wave of refugees escaping wars from the 
Middle East and Africa posed a new challenge, as they flood on Europe’s doorstep, prompting to 
stretch fences back again.   
From Athens to Berlin, from Rome to Stockholm, waves of asylum seekers roamed on the 
streets. Europeans watched live on TV screen, a scene of utter human suffering, reminiscent of 
Second-World-War. In the meantime, across Europe, Islamic terrorist attack targeting civilians 
mounted, killing hundreds and some European cities looked like war-zones, with armed soldiers 
                                                          
2 Statistics Norway, “Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents;” available at   
https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/SelectTable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=innvbef&CMSSubjectArea=
befolkning&StatVariant=&PLanguage=1&checked=true; site accessed 31 March 2016. 
3 UDI, “Asylsøknader etter statsborgerskap og år (2007-2014)”; available at https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-
analyse/statistikk/asylsoknader-etter-statsborgerskap-og-ar-2007-2014/; site accessed 24 April 2016 
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patrolling streets become the norm. European open-door humanitarian tradition faced a real test, 
with right wing-parties using the statuesque gained more voters across Germany, France and 
Sweden. The Germans were exceptional in their rapid response, sheltering more than one million 
refugees in 2015 alone, mostly Syrian refugees escaping civil-war.  
Amidst the growing number of refugees coming to Europe seeking refuge, countries such 
as Denmark, Sweden and Norway worried by the influx rushed to tighten their borders, 
jeopardizing the notion of borderless Europe.4 In the Schengen area (European Union), people 
travel without visa requirement. The bloc terminated checks at most internal borders in 1995, and 
now 26 nations are part of the passport-free Schengen area, the free movement of people across 
borders.5 Like terrorism, illegal migration has brought European countries to a standstill, struggling 
to balance humanitarianism with security.  
 Migration ‘Exodus’ of Eritreans  
In 2015, more than one million refugees sought asylum in the European Union, a record number 
of asylum application after the Second World-War. While majority of the asylum seekers were 
Syrians, Eritreans were the largest group relative to the population size of the country, which 
roughly stands at 5.5 million. 6 Norway is among the most popular destination for Eritrean asylum 
seekers. In 2015, the overall asylum application in Norway stood at 31,145, of whom almost three 
thousand were Eritreans.7 
 The UNHCR estimates that about 5,000 Eritreans flee the country each month and that as 
of mid-2014, more than 313,000 Eritreans, over 5 percent of the population have fled the country.8 
The current refugee influx started after the end of the border war with Ethiopia. In may 
1998 war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, after both countries contested the disputed border 
                                                          
4 Al Jazeera and Agencies, “Denmark and Sweden tighten border controls;” available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/denmark-sweden-tighten-border-control-160104140849704.html; 
site accessed 05 February 2016. 
5 Jonathan Stearns and Jonathan Tirone, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis;” available at 
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/europe-refugees; site accessed 09 February 2016. 
6 Matina Stevis and Joe Parkinson, “Thousands Flee Isolated Eritrea to Escape Life of Conscription and Poverty,” 
Wall Street Journal; available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/eritreans-flee-conscription-and-poverty-adding-to-the-
migrant-crisis-in-europe-1445391364; site accessed 05 February 2016. 
7 Norwegian Immigration Department, “Asylum Decisions by Citizenship and Outcome (2015),” available at 
https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/statistikk/asylvedtak-etter-statsborgerskap-og-utfall-2015/; site accessed 05 
February 2016. 
8 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2015: Eritrea”; available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-
chapters/eritrea; site accessed 09 February 2016. 
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town of Badme. The war continued for three years (1998-2000) costing the lives of more than one 
hundred thousand from both sides and ended with the signing of the Algiers agreement in 
December 2000.9 
Soon after the end of the border conflict with Ethiopia, senior Eritrean government officials 
and other high ranking military leaders demanded political reform and the establishment of a 
constitutional government. In September 2001, one week after the terrorist attack in New York, the 
president jailed all the reformists. Ever since then, none of them were put on trial, and no one 
knows their whereabouts, according to some eyewitness testimonies, most of them are presumed 
dead.10 
Human Rights Watch, blamed the President of the country Isaias Afewerki for the lack of 
political reform and human rights violations in its 2014 annual country report. 
Eritrea’s dismal human rights situation, exacerbated by indefinite military conscription, is 
causing thousands of Eritreans to flee their country every month. In early 2014, President 
Isaias Afewerki confirmed his lack of interest in an open society, stating: “[I]f there is 
anyone who thinks there will be democracy or [a] multiparty system in this country ... 
then that person can think of such things in another world.11 
The luck of freedom and the institutionalization of indefinite military service for all 
nationals beyond the age of 18 is forcing many Eritrean youths to flee the country and seek refuge 
in neighboring countries mainly Ethiopia and Sudan. Many of them continue their journey to 
Europe via the Mediterranean Sea and hundreds of them die in the process. Others attempt to reach 
Israel via the Sinai desert12. If kidnaped by the smugglers had to pay ransom from 30,000 to 40,000 
US dollars and this money is often paid by family members in the West.13 
                                                          
9 United Nations, “Security Council Welcomes Peace Agreement Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Urges Full, 
Expeditious Cooperation with United Nations Mission”; available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7011.doc.htm; site accessed 05 February 2016. 
10Human Rights Watch, “Eritrea: Free Political Prisoners Ten Years On;” available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/22/eritrea-free-political-prisoners-10-years, site accessed 09 February 2016. 
11 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2015: Eritrea”. 
12 Halted at the moment, after Israel built a border fence on the Sinai Desert. 
13 Suzette Standring, “Close the Torture House in the Sinai and Egypt”; available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/suzette-standring/close-the-torture-houses-_b_4945890.html; site accessed 10 
February 2016. 
12 
 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, as of 
2014 more than 216,000 Eritrean refugees sheltered in Ethiopia and Sudan alone. 14 In the same 
year, 37,000 Eritrean sought asylum in Europe, and most asylum requests were registered in 
Sweden (9,531), Germany, (9,362) Switzerland (5,652), the Netherlands (4,113) and Norway 
(2882).  
Figure 1 source UDI15 
And in 2015 the number of Eritreans seeking asylum in Norway slightly increased to 2947, 
making Eritreans the second largest group after Syrians.16 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 UNHCR, “Number of Eritreans seeking asylum in Europe soars over figures for last year,” available at    
http://www.unhcr.org/546606286.html; site accessed 09 February 2016. 
15 UDI, “Asylsøknader etter statsborgerskap og år (2007-2014)”.  
16 Norwegian Immigration Department, “Asylum Decisions by Citizenship and Outcome (2015)”.  
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Figure 1: Source UNHCR17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background to Norway Eritrea Relations 
The initial contact between Eritrea and Norway dates back as far as 1949, when Norway became 
one of the five countries selected by the United Nations to determine the fate of Eritrea. This was 
after the defeat of the Italians by the British, who colonized the country for half a century from 
1890–1941. Christine Smith-Simonsen, a Norwegian researcher on Eritrea states, the Norwegian 
delegation supported the proposal for Eritrea to join with its southern neighbor Ethiopia under 
federal arrangement.18 
In the late 1970s, Eritrean liberation movement came in contact with Norwegian actors 
within the political left and various humanitarian organizations. Eventually, relationships 
developed and networks established at several levels, primarily within civil society in relation to 
NGOs and solidarity associations. After independence of Eritrea in 1993, Eritrea was one of 
Norway's main aid recipient countries. However, the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 1998 
                                                          
17 UNHCR, “Number of Eritreans seeking asylum in Europe soars over figures for last year”. 
18 Christine Smith-Simonse, “Eritrea I våre hjerter?: En studie av Norske Relasjoner til Eritrea” (Tromsø: University 
of Tromsø, 2006), 5. 
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to 2000 and the subsequent political developments in Eritrea led to the downgrading of cooperation 
after 2002.19 
The involvement by the Norwegian government was the result of the work of voluntary 
organizations and individuals and the Eritrean expatriate community. Eritrean immigrants 
succeeded in navigating potential donors and made contacts within key political circles in the West. 
Smith-Simonsen argues, Scandinavian countries in general, particularly Norway, appeared 
attractive because of the short distance between the state and civil society.20 
Research Problem 
Often local media in Norway report inter-communal tension among Eritrean diaspora community, 
during cultural evenings.21 Homeland political issues is claimed as the main reason for the tension 
and division. Some members of the Eritrean diaspora community fundraise in the name of 
homeland development, others strongly oppose them, accusing their contribution would strengthen 
the grip of power by the ‘totalitarian government’.  
Migration development nexus focus on migrants’ remittance role in generating 
development in the least developing countries (LCD), often where migrants come from.22 
However, the migration development debate is greatly focused on the case of economic migrants, 
giving little attention on the implication of remittance in the case of refugee-producing countries. 
My subject of interest is mainly focused on figuring out the significance of Eritrean diaspora 
remittance in driving homeland development in the absence of a democratic government.   
My impression is that, human traffickers and neighboring countries are reaping the benefits 
of hard currency sent by Eritrean diaspora, where hundreds of thousands live as refugees. These 
refugees mainly depend on the assistance of their close relatives mostly residing in the western 
world. The research would attempt to address, how this persistent dependence, affects Eritrean 
diaspora’s socio-economic life in Norway.  
                                                          
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Ibid., v.  
21 Ina Gundersen, «Ap vil nekte kommunal utleie til eritreiske foreninger»; available at 
http://www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/lokalt/stavanger/Ap-vil-nekte-kommunal-utleie-til-eritreiske-foreninger-
3831728.html; site accessed 12 April 2016.  
22 Nina Glick Schiller and Thomas Faist, Migration, Development and Transnationalization: A Critical Stance 
(United States: Berghahn Books, 2010), 7.  
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As anti-asylum seekers rhetoric is growing across Europe, Norwegian politicians are also 
instituting tough migrations laws, in an effort of deterring others. One fear factor is the growing 
pessimism on the prospect of integration and financial burden. Likewise, some main stream medias 
and politicians talk of refugees or immigrants; in a negative sense or address the issue of refugee 
'influx' with skepticism.23 In this regard, attempts are made to explore the challenges and 
opportunities Eritrean immigrants face in the process of integration, and this will enable me to 
discuss the implications of integration for homeland development. 
Research Questions 
The research addresses issues of migration and development with a particular emphasis on political 
and economic transnational activity, and its influence on the social relations in the Eritreans 
community. The main research question is finding the role of Eritrean refugees in Norway for the 
homeland-development. These are some of the sub-questions: 
 What are the opportunities and challenges for Eritrean refugees in working together for the 
homeland-development? 
 What challenges do Eritrean refugees face in sending remittance, and who are the main 
beneficiaries? 
 What are the causes of Eritrean mass-migration and why they choose to come to Norway? 
 What are the relationships between integration and homeland-development? 
Significance of the Study 
My interest in the topic emanates from my personal experience, as a refugee in Norway, seen fellow 
compatriots abandoning the country in droves. In the process spend thousands of US dollars, money 
acquired from close or distant relatives often residents of Western Countries. After arriving in the 
West, they remain preoccupied with the deteriorating socio-economic and political developments 
in the homeland. They often resort to smuggle-out remaining family members to the west remitting 
thousands of dollars, and in doing so consciously or otherwise deplete the nations human resource. 
There seems to be a constant cycle of migration, i.e. in this case migration accelerating further 
migration. How could this migration ‘influx’ affect Eritrea, both in the short and long-term requires 
objective scrutiny. Therefore, in reducing the migration flow, understanding the root causes of 
                                                          
23 Nilas Johnsen, “Det frykter PST ved Asylstrømmen til Norge”, VG Newspaper; available at   
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/terrorangrepene-i-paris/dette-frykter-pst-ved-asylstroemmen-til-
norge/a/23562285/; site accessed 20 November 2015.  
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Eritrean migration is paramount, before dealing with its remedies. It could also contribute in 
creating awareness about the long-term risks for the homeland and short-term challenges for the 
receiving state. In this case, this research could help to facilitate diaspora’s constructive and 
informed engagement with the homeland, in eventually reducing the flow of migration, perhaps in 
generating a reverse migration at some point in the future.  
In addition, in a state of closed legal avenues of migration for refugees, Eritrean diasporas 
are desperately resorting to illegal migration using traffickers in resettling fellow family members. 
Western governments continue to impose strict migration regulations, by strengthening asylum and 
visa requirements, especially to people from developing countries. The more legal avenues of 
migration get closed, the more traffickers seem to stand to benefit asking exorbitant amount of 
money, leading asylum seekers into taking dangerous journeys. In this case, the research could 
contribute to the contemporary migration debate. It could also be useful for policy makers, for 
individual actors and institutions working with refugees.  
Limitations of the Study 
Eritrean government recognizes nine ethnic groups, and Tigrigna ethnic group counts for almost 
half of the entire population. My respondents were predominantly members one ethnic group i.e. 
Tigrigna. In addition, Eritrea is demographically divided between half Muslim and half Christian 
and all my informants were Christians. I made some attempts to include Muslim informants but 
was unsuccessful.  
The study is mainly based on interviews with eight Eritrean immigrants/refugees, and two 
Norwegians working with Eritrean refugees and on personal observations. Most of my Eritrean 
informants were active opponents of the government, while some of them were not.  
The other limitation is my Eritrean nationality and journalistic background. My nationality 
could have some unintended bias on the research. In addition, I worked as a journalist in Eritrea 
both for the private and state media. After I left my country in 2007, I wrote some critical articles 
against the government. In this case, my anti-homeland government political stance proved to be a 
challenge in interviewing those who support. For this reason, hardcore Eritrean government 
supporters are excluded. But, some of my informants were recently pro-government supporters, 
therefore, attempts are made to include both parties. 
17 
 
Definition of key Terms 
The following concepts and terms are used in the research and their meaning is elaborated: 
 Asylum seeker:  an asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but 
whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated. 24 
 Diaspora: a group of people who live outside the area in which they had lived 
for a long time or in which their ancestors lived. 25 
 Immigrant: a person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country.26 
 Integration: the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as 
individuals and as groups.27 
 Naturalized citizen: Legal process by which a citizen of one country becomes a citizen 
of another. It generally requires that the person be staying in the adopted country for a 
specified minimum period.28 
 Refugee: The 1951 Refugee Convention spells out that a refugee is someone who 
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country." 29 
 Transnationalism: refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions 
across the borders of nation state. 30 
                                                          
24 UNHCR, “Asylum Seeker,” available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html; site accessed 02 April 
2016. 
25 Meriam-Webster, “Diaspora” available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diaspora; site accessed 07 
February 2016. 
26 Oxford Dictionaries, “Immigrant,” available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/immigrant; 
site accessed 07 February 2016. 
27 Rinus Penninx, “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,” Migration Policy Institute, 
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/integration-role-communities-institutions-and-state; site accessed 
02 April 2016. 
28 Buisness Dictionary, “Naturalized Citizen,” available at 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/naturalization.html; site accessed 02 April 2016.  
29 UNHCR, “Flowing Across Borders,” available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html; site accessed 07 
February 2016. 
30 Steven Vertovec, “Transnationalism” (London: Routledge, 2009), 1.  
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Terminological Challenge 
One of the challenges in writing this thesis is finding an appropriate title in referring my informants. 
As some of my informants have been living in Norway for many decades, I found it inappropriate 
to call them refugees, but as others were recently arrived, I found it unfitting to called them 
immigrants either. Therefore, I ended up using both words interchangeably and at several instances, 
I also used diaspora in referring the entire group.  
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CHAPTER  TWO 
RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The research focuses on the role of Eritrean refugees in Norway for the homeland-development, 
largely in light of political and economic perspectives. I want to understand the state of Eritrean 
refugees’ engagement and contribution for homeland-development and how such engagements 
impact their daily lives in the host country. I have attempted to uncover the main challenges and 
opportunities for Eritrean immigrants in the role of ‘Development Agents’. 
In this chapter, discussions of data collection methods such as the existing literature in the 
library, selection of respondents, setting selection, doing interviews and ethical guidelines for 
conducting the research are presented. I also discuss my role as a researcher, in relation with issues 
of objectivity. 
Why Qualitative Research 
Customarily, we have two major research methods in acquiring knowledge, i.e. qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Both methods differ in the philosophy of understanding epistemology and 
data gathering mechanisms. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkins state that, there were recurrent 
debates among scholars regarding relative advantage and uses of the two approaches.31 Qualitative 
and quantitative approaches are often referred as naturalism and positivism respectively. Today the 
term ‘positivism’ has become little more than a term of misuse among social scientists, as a result, 
its meaning has become buried.32 Most social scientists are increasingly using a qualitative method 
as the main system of data collection.  
Among the major tenets of positivism is the argument that states, the methodological model 
for social research is physical science, conceived in terms of the logic of the experiment. Where 
quantitatively measured variables are manipulated in order to identify the relationship among 
them.33 And this idea has taken to be as the defining feature of science. Hammersley states, 
positivism uses statistical laws as the goal for science and they also claim the foundation for science 
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2007), 5.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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is observation. They give priority to phenomena that are directly observable or that can be logically 
inferred from what is observable; any appeal to imperceptibility runs the risk of being dismissed 
as metaphysical assumption. 
Qualitative research is chosen in this research over quantitative, for the former is more 
appropriate in surveying a real-world setting. Robert K. Yin, elaborates why one needs to choose 
qualitative approach: 
You just might want to study a real-world setting, discover how people cope and thrive in 
that setting-and capture the contextual richness of people’s everyday lives. Just consider 
the variety of topics that you might be able to study. 34 
Hence, as the study is mainly descriptive in nature, qualitative method is found more 
appropriate. Through qualitative method, I could uncover an in-depth data in understanding social 
reality. It gives me as a researcher the ability to understand the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, which 
I can’t normally answer via a quantitative method. 
From this elaboration, qualitative research is more rich in its methodology and gives room 
for maneuvering in exploring the larger picture behind observable phenomena. Therefore, using 
qualitative technique is more convincing as the tool, in addressing my central research problems. 
Methods of Data Collection, In-Depth Interview 
Hammersley argues, when a researcher uses naturalism, it is favorable to use non-directive 
interviewing, in which the interviewee is allowed to talk at length in his or her own terms, as 
opposed to more directive questioning. The objective is to minimize, as much as possible, the 
influence of the researcher on what is said, and thus to enable open expression of the informant’s 
perspective on the world. 35 This enabled me to learn new perspectives from my informants, while 
at the same time limiting my influence on the data outcome. Thus, I opted to use semi-structured 
interviews, and conducted an in-depth interview with eight carefully selected individuals. In this 
case, as a researcher my questions were lose, in a sense that I didn’t ask each interviewee precisely 
the same questions. 36 
However, I have carefully constructed the interview guide, to gain more knowledge on the 
opinions of my informants. First, I wrote down the larger research questions, then outlined the 
                                                          
34 Robert Y. Kin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish (New York: The Guilford Press,2011), 3. 
35 Hammersley and Atkinson, Ethnography, 101. 
36 Ibid., 117. 
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broad areas of knowledge that are relevant to answering these questions. After that, I developed 
questions within each of these major areas, shaping them to fit a selected respondent. My main 
objective was to tap into their experiences and personal views. 
I had also to adjust the language of the interview according to the respondents (age, gender, 
marital status). I worded my questions so that my respondents could be motivated to answer as 
honestly as possible. I often preferred asking 'how' questions rather than 'why' questions, to get 
stories of process, for example, “How did you come to Norway?” 
I prepared the interview guide in the opening with a warm-up question, whereby the 
respondent could answer easily and at some length, however, without speaking too long. It doesn’t 
have to be related directly to what I was trying to find out (although at times it might), but this 
initial rapport-establishing put me as an interviewer more at ease with my respondent and thus 
made the rest of the interview flow more smoothly. I was also thinking about the logical flow of 
the interview, even though, it was difficult at times. In addition, what types of follow-up questions 
should come next? 
Difficult or potentially personal ''sensitive'' questions were asked toward the end of the 
interview, after rapport was established. The last question provided some closure for the interview, 
and left the respondent feeling empowered and listened. 
Choosing informants 
In qualitative research, the focus is getting an in-depth insight on a particular subject. 
Correspondingly, explanations generated from the study are expected to enable us to understand 
the social reality among the wider refugee population. In this case, the selection process becomes 
vital, by keeping in mind on how much valuable data could be generated. I was convinced in 
selecting my informants carefully, taking into consideration my selection criteria. Hammersley and 
Atkinson elaborate on the different criteria in selecting informants: 
The sampling of persons may sometimes be undertaken in terms of fairly standard ‘face-
sheet’ demographic criteria. That is depending on the particular context, one may sample 
persons by reference to categories of gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, age, occupation, 
educational qualifications, and so on.37 
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In this regard, I weighted on the comparative advantage of carefully selecting my 
informants to that of random selection. I interviewed ten individuals, two of whom were 
Norwegians working with Eritrean refugees. Two of my Eritrean informants were women. Besides 
gender, I also took into consideration informants’ educational background, age, marital status, 
duration of stay in Norway, as the main selection criteria. Selecting informants based on religious 
beliefs and ethnicity was difficult in using them as informant selection criteria. Regarding age, 
there is a gap of over forty years between the youngest and oldest informants, and this has enabled 
me to conduct comparative analysis between the first and contemporary generation of refugees’ 
life experience. 
Even though, most of my informants had good command of the English language and 
Norwegian, I preferred conducting all interviews in the informants’ mother-language Tigrigna.  
Interviewing them in English might have been much easier, as it might have spared me from 
translating. However, I was convinced of the advantages of doing the interview in their mother 
language, as it enable them to express their ideas easily and deeply. In addition, it also helped me 
in understanding their views better, removing linguistic barriers, as we share a common language. 
But, I saw this as both an advantage and a challenge. 
After conducting interviews, the transcription script was written in Tigrigna and translated 
into English in the processes of presenting findings and analysis. 
Setting selection 
My informants chose interview setting. I consciously gave them this choice in order to make sure 
the interview was done in a relaxed atmosphere. In this regard, Hammersley and Atkinson wrote 
on the advantages of allowing informants to choose the setting: 
With many people interviewing them on their own territory, and allowing them to 
organize the context the way they wish, is the best strategy. It allows them to relax much 
more than they would in less familiar surroundings.38 
I found this method effective, as it enabled my informants to feel comfortable in telling 
their life stories. Most of my respondents chose their homes as a setting, and it gave them a sense 
of security, while sharing their personal stories. This rapport also exhibited the level of trust my 
informants bestowed me. When rapport is established to that extent, informants give detailed 
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information that otherwise might remain hidden. However, a couple of respondents chose the 
library and a cafeteria as a setting. 
Validity and Reliability 
Eventually, the goal of research is to understand the social reality. In this case, the validity of the 
data gathered is crucial. Invalid data could potentially compromise research findings. One of the 
reasons why researchers doubt on the validity of explanation, if the researcher has clearly made no 
effort to deal with opposing cases or to locate an example in a broader context. David Silverman, 
raises a good question, why qualitative researchers need to convince themselves first before 
attempting to convince others, on the reliability of the data collected: 
Nonetheless, qualitative researchers, with their in-depth access to single cases, have to 
overcome a special temptation. How are they to convince themselves (and their audience) 
that their ‘findings’ are genuinely based on critical investigation of all their data and do 
not depend on a few well-chosen ‘examples’?39 
Without deep self-reflection and critical analysis on the lessons learned, and cross-
examination of data gathered, it certainly is a challenge to come up with a valid data. It therefore 
becomes important to cross-check findings, and one way of overcoming this challenge is through 
conducting ‘Triangulation’ analysis method. Silverman defines Triangulations ‘as to the attempt to 
get a ‘true’ fix on a situation by combining different ways of looking at it (method triangulation) 
or different finding (data triangulation).’40 In this case, I have been reading secondary information 
on newspapers and on the internet. In addition, I used my respondent’s validation, whenever I had 
doubts, I went back to my informants with my tentative results and refined my data in light of my 
subjects’ feedbacks. 
Even though the term ‘reliability’ is a concept used for evaluating or testing quantitative 
research, the idea is most often used in all kinds of research. If we see the idea of testing as a way 
of data elicitation, then the most significant test of any quantitative study is its quality. ‘A good 
qualitative study can help us “understand a situation that would otherwise be enigmatic or 
confusing.’ 41 
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I encountered one incident from one of my informants that raised reliability issue. Finding 
contradictory data, made me skeptical to treat his information seriously. Informants honesty could 
be subject to subjective evaluation by the researcher but obviously, when data contradict each other 
at some point, it becomes highly unlikely to use them. 
The person interviewed was someone I closely knew before, and perhaps feeling 
uncomfortable during the interview with a tape-recorder on, opted to give me a slightly different 
narration. This is one classical example; a researcher could encounter in interviewing people you 
happen to know close. This also raises questions, had it not been my previous knowledge, I might 
not had suspected his sincerity. It is for this reason; critical examination of data becomes a necessity 
in generating reliable data. Robert K. Yin elaborates on the importance of proper data collection 
and examination: 
A valid study is one that has properly collected and interpreted its data, so that the 
conclusions accurately reflect and represent the real world that was studied. Conversely, 
studies in any field are worthless if they arrive at false findings. Such an extreme outcome 
is unlikely to occur, but studies should nevertheless use design features that will 
strengthen the validity of their claims and findings.42 
In order to escape from this impasse, one has to take often time and raise questions in testing 
the reliability of the data collected. My informant, perhaps might have changed his mind ever since 
we met last. The most important thing is to question on the validity of the data gathered, before 
starting analyzing.  
Secondary Data 
I have extensively searched for relevant research materials on the web, and got a number of useful 
working papers relevant to the project. As far as my knowledge is concerned, there is no relevant 
research material written on the role of Eritrean refugees in Norway regarding homeland 
development. However, I found one interesting Ph.D. research publication by a Norwegian 
researcher Christine Smith-Simonsen entitled “Eritrea in our hearts?” that mainly address on the 
contribution of Norwegian individual actors and humanitarian organizations in the development 
assistance to Eritrea. Simonsen’s main focus was on the period of the armed struggle from 1961-
1991 and in the immediate post-independence period, for this reason, I was not able to use much 
out it. 
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A couple of writers extensively written on the role of Eritrean diaspora’s transnationalism 
taking sampling Eritreans in the UK43 and across Europe.44 I gained good insight from both 
literature materials, as discussed in chapter four. 
In addition, I extensively used relevant textbooks from the library at the School of Mission 
and Theology in Stavanger. Besides, other journals and publication on the internet, local and 
international newspapers were also used as a source of data. 
Ethical Issues and my Role as The Researcher 
From the outset, I was conscious of the possible ethical issues I might encounter in the course of 
the field work. I followed the ethical research guidelines specified by the School of Mission and 
Theology in Stavanger, which helped me a lot in remaining conscious in handling sensitive issues.  
Before starting the research, I also had requested approval on my research methodology 
from the Norwegian Social Science Data Service Department(NSD). Among others, some of the 
major requirements of NSD are protecting informant’s confidentiality and the means of data 
storage during investigation. 
I prepared an interview consent that requires participants of the research to sign before 
doing the interviews. In the consent, I plainly provided the topic of research, the institution, 
confidentiality and the source of funds. Also, respondents were notified the interview was consent-
based and they can withdraw from the research prior to the research completion. Information was 
also given on how data will be protected during the course of the study and eventually to get deleted 
after the end of the project.  
In protecting my informants’ confidentiality, in the discussion chapters, I am referring them 
with numbers from 1 to 7, when presenting data collected from interviews. However, two of my 
informants opted to use their real names. As they are already public figures, often writing articles 
on the Eritrean issue in local newspapers and websites, I was also convinced using their real names 
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might not jeopardize their privacy. One Norwegian informant was also mentioned with a real name, 
on the condition of her consent.  
During the fieldwork, I was at times feeling uneasy, if the gathered data would eventually 
be useful for my research. Would it help me answer my central research questions? At times, I felt 
lost, wondering if I had asked the right questions. I had to check back and forth my questionnaire 
guidelines. However, that sense of uneasiness slowly faded away, when I started to concentrate on 
the most important issues.  
As is the case in any qualitative research, no matter how well research questions are 
prepared; I remained open for any data to review my research questions accordingly. After all, my 
mission was not to confirm my preconceived theory (deductive), but to understand the social reality 
from the base. In this case, I had to restructure my research questions, being cautious wrong 
questions could lead my research into wrong conclusions. In this regard, I found it much more 
useful to use inductive reasoning, expecting the outcome of the study in generating a new 
explanation of the social reality. 
I remained open for all eventualities restraining my personal bias (at my best ability at 
least), in understanding the social reality scientifically. Moreover, I was fortunate to get informants, 
each of whom with rich individual life experiences. I am convinced their story epitomizes somehow 
their own peers regarding age, educational background and gender. Out of eight my Eritrean 
informants, none of them had close age proximity. Some of them were university students, workers, 
and others were retirees. 
My informants came to Norway for different reasons, under different circumstances. Some 
of them as asylum seekers, others through family reunification. Understanding why they came to 
Norway helped me to answer; how they perceive the social reality in Norway. As I learnt from my 
preliminary study, there is a big opinion difference among them. This enabled me to employ 
comparative analysis based on their individual life experience on their perception of social reality. 
What I initially perceived as an advantage was doing research with my journalism 
background. But, I learned later, writing as a journalist and as a researcher is remotely close. In 
this case, I ended up constantly reminding myself as a researcher, keeping the golden rules of 
academic work. 
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Studying your fellow countrymen was also not without a challenge. Especially without 
critical reflection, sharing the same language might be frivolously deemed as an advantage. Some 
of my informants were friends or friends of my friends. For this reason, I was constantly reflecting 
on this issue, asking myself, if I had made the right decision? Was I asking the right questions? 
Undeniably, having a good network and close relationship helped me build mutual trust with my 
informants but not sure at what cost. Could the same research questions, generate similar outcome 
by an outsider? Could my informants might have behaved more politically correct to a stranger 
than to one of their own? Obviously, there are advantages and disadvantages, when it comes to 
studying people with the same background.  
In addition, consciously or unconsciously, one may not escape from the bias problem. But 
it helps, staying well prepared beforehand, reminding yourself on the task of gathering data, and 
putting aside personal opinions and beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL  PERSPECTIVE  ON  MIGRATION  
DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the major migration theories are discussed in the first part. In the second part, the 
main contentious issues in the debate between pessimists and optimists, on migration development 
discourse are presented. In the end, current thinking on the relations between migration, 
development and conflict is examined. 
General Migration Theories 
As the migration development research is intrinsically interdisciplinary, there is no widely accepted 
dominant theory. The study involves sociology, political science, law, demography, economics, 
geography, psychology and cultural studies. However, there are several theories that explain why 
international migration begins, such as, the neoclassical economics theory, historical-structural 
theory, the new economics of migration theory, segmented labor market theory, and the world 
system theory. Following will be the presentation of discussions on the first three major theories, 
which overly dominate the debate on migration development. 
The Neo-Classical Equilibrium Perspective 
The first major academic contribution to the study of migration is mainly based on the two articles 
written by the nineteenth-century geographer Ravenstein, where he framed his “Laws of 
Migration” from 1985.45 He elaborated on the strong inseparable link between migration and 
development, emphasizing that, the major cause of migration is economic. He presumed that 
migration is closely connected with "push-pull" factors. Push factors such as high unemployment 
rates, low wages, lack of health care, and pull factors such as: high wages, low unemployment force 
people towards leaving their countries of residence. In this case, he underscores the main cause for 
migration is the pursuit of better economic opportunities abroad. 
At the micro-level, neo-classical migration theory considers migrants as individual rational 
actors, who decide to travel abroad on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.46 Provided they have a 
free choice and full access to information, individuals are anticipated to go where they can be the 
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46 Ibid., 5. 
29 
 
most productive, in this case, where they are able to earn the highest wages. This capacity obviously 
depends on the specific skills a person holds and on the specific structure of labor markets. 
Russell King, criticizes Ravenstein ideas for placing more emphasize on internal than 
international migration.47 Here are some of the main critical observations he made: 
 Migrants move mainly over short distances; those going longer distances head for the great 
centers of industry and commerce. 
 Most migration is from agricultural to industrial areas. 
 Large towns grow more by migration than by natural increase. 
 Migration increases along with the development of industry, commerce and transport. 
 Each migration stream produces a counter stream. 
 Females are more migratory than males, at least over shorter distances; males are only a 
majority in international migration. 
 The major causes of migration are economic. 
King’s critical observation, help us to understand more on the limitations of understanding 
international migration based on Ravensteins elaboration. In this case, it is important to discuss 
other theories of migration in understanding international migration phenomena through a different 
angle. 
Historical-Structural Theory and Asymmetric Growth 
A fundamentally different explanation of migration was provided as of the 1960s by the historical-
structural paradigm on development, which places its intellectual roots in Marxist political 
economy and in world systems theory.48 Hein de Haas elaborates, contemporary historical-
structural theory mainly developed in response to functionalist (neo-classical) and 
developmentalist-modernizationist methods towards development. Historical-structuralists assume 
that economic and political power is unevenly distributed among developed and underdeveloped 
countries, that people have unequal access to resources, and that capitalist expansion has the 
tendency to reinforce these inequalities.49 This theory further stipulates, instead of modernizing 
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and steadily progressing towards economic development, underdeveloped countries are trapped by 
their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure. 
Another explanation of the structural theory is the concept developed by M. J. Piore as 'dual 
labor markets'. This term denotes to the two types of jobs that are prevalent in a capitalist economy. 
The first are the safe, permanent high-skilled and well-paid jobs. The second are the momentary, 
unpleasant, low status jobs, low-paid, also known as the 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and 
demanding).50 These jobs provide limited opportunities for promotion to better jobs, and are often 
unguarded by workers’ rights legislation and labor standards. In many cases local workers are not 
attracted in such badly paid jobs, therefore they are taken up by new migrants.51 
New Economics of Migration Theory 
This theory is considered as an extension of neo-classical migration perspectives, which emerged 
in the 1980s, and views migration as the result of a decision made by families or groups than by 
individuals.52 Migration decisions regarded to be based on an analysis of costs and benefits by a 
family or a community, which seeks to maximize its income by minimizing risks that may result 
such as from crop failures. This approach has been termed the ‘new economics of migration’.53  
           Similar to the neoclassical models, push-pull factors are employed to understand the 
family’s or groups decision making. One such example would be, when a family decides to send 
one of its members to work in another country and depend on remittances to minimize the risks for 
the rest of the family. 
Aleksandra Tomanek outlined the following central ideas based on this model, the text is 
paraphrased:54 
 Families, households and other culturally defined units of production and consumption are 
those who count in analysis for migration research (not individuals). 
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 A wage disparity is not the necessary condition for making a decision to migrate to another 
country. 
 When wage inequality fades, does not necessarily mean international migration stops. The 
conviction to migration will exist if other markets in the country of origin such as: capital 
market, insurance market, consumer credit market etc. are absent or deficient. 
 Governments could change the size of migration flows through amending labor markets 
and, in case they do not exist or are imperfect. 
Her elaboration helps us to understand why individual’s economic factor may not be 
sufficient in explaining why people opt to migrate, by enabling us to see migration flow in the 
context of a family or a country. 
However, this theory neglects the role of political instability and lack of freedom in forcing 
people to leave their countries in search of protection abroad. Like Ravensteins idea, the emphasis 
is placed on the economic factor, without discussing migration in the context of political instability. 
This might have been the biggest shortfall of this theory, in most cases, poverty is the result of poor 
governance and political instability.  
Optimists Versus Pessimists 
Over the last five decades, the effect of migration on development in migrant sending countries has 
been the subject of persistent and sometimes heated debate with opposing views of the “migration 
optimists” and “migration pessimists.55 The diverse views on migration and development reflect 
the deeper paradigmatic divisions in social theory (i.e., functionalist versus structuralist paradigms) 
and development theory (i.e., balanced growth versus asymmetric development paradigms). To a 
substantial extent, this also reflects ideological disparities between neoliberal and state‐centrist 
views.56 
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The migration optimists are largely motivated by neo-classical migration economy and 
developmentalist modernization theories, which are all associated to the functionalist paradigm in 
social theory.57  In spite of the differences between neo-classical and developmentalist views, they 
both believe that migration generally has a positive impact on the development process in sending 
countries. However, in an effective neo-classical world, the developmental role of migration is 
fully realized through price equalization. Common developmentalists expect migration to generate 
counter flows of capital to sending country via remittances, investment and knowledge. They 
believe this to subsequently stimulate development and modernization. In particular return 
migrants are seen as active agents of economic growth. Most migration pessimists appeal to 
structuralist social theory58, which encompasses neo-Marxist dependency world systems. In 
general, structuralist tend to address the issue of migration development as a negative phenomenon 
contributing to the further underdevelopment of sending countries. 
De Haas summarizes the contentious views on migration development between pessimists 
and optimists. 
Table 1. Opposing views on Migration-development between optimists and pessimists. 59 
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The table illustrates the strong opposing views, which are yet to be settled in the migration 
development discourse. My position is pessimistic in the debate, even though lately scholars are 
arguing on the benefit of remittance for sending countries. Remittance alone cannot outweigh the 
consequences and guarantee sustainable long-term development. Most often, the rich or educated 
class tend to immigrate and their absence creates shortage of capable manpower, which is critical 
in building sustainable development. Capital flow in itself can hardly achieve durable economic 
growth, it only creates more unequal society, leading to more migration. And more migration deters 
development as more and more people tend to look outward for economic opportunity, than 
working to develop their country. Thus, receiving countries benefit from cheap labor, while sending 
countries suffer from shortage of manpower and stagnant economy, remaining constant source of 
cheap labor to the rich northern countries. 
The New ‘Migration-and-Development’ Optimism 
The academic and policy debates on migration and development have a habit of swinging back and 
forth like a pendulum from optimism in 1970s to pessimism in the 1990s, and back again to more 
optimistic views in recent years.60 Perhaps a few years down the line the current optimism, could 
shift towards pessimism. There is no absolute truth on the subject of migration development; it is 
in the eye of the beholder. What could be positive for developed countries may not be the case for 
sending countries.  
However, Oded Stark and David E. Bloom elaborate on the new migration development 
optimism by arguing migration could benefit everyone provided governments pursue the right 
policies.61 They emphasise on the enjoyment of freedom and higher living standard by migrants 
but noted the risk of vulnerability. Individual migrants certainly benefit from enjoyment of equal 
right, perhaps become naturalized citizen at one stage. On the other hand, migrants could also 
remain vulnerable in terms of finding lucrative and secure jobs. This is noticed especially in times 
of economic crisis.  
                                                          
60 Ibid.   
61 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom. The New Economics of Labour Migration, The American Economic Review 
75(2): 173-78; available at 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/SummerSchool2013/readings/Kaczmarczyk_Reading%206.pdf; site 
visited 10 March 2016.  
34 
 
Stark and Bloom also stated that, destination countries benefit from cheap low-skill labour 
and new ideas, however also risk ethnic tension. The risk could be both in short and long-term. As 
society becomes more heterogeneous the risk of ethnic tension is there, especially when integration 
fails, and systematic marginalization exist. In the short-term receiving countries could benefit from 
cheap labour.  
Sending countries win through remittances and knowledge transfers, however, risk brain-
drain. At a policy level the risks of migration are best minimized and rewards maximized by 
encouraging ‘circular migration’ and ‘engaging diasporas’.62 These are the two most important 
policy recommendation in the migration development discourse and their discussion follow.  
Circular Migration 
Circular migration is gradually recognized as one of the few means for resources to flow from core 
areas (cities and high-income countries) to peripheral areas (rural areas and low-income 
countries).63 The temporary migrants are the main agents of circular migration, assumed likely to 
engage in sending remittance to their families more often than the permanent ones. It is argued as 
long as there is an idea of going back home, solid financial base becomes a prerequisite. 
But what does circular migration entails? Mercedes Fernández and Mª Carolina Parra 
attempt to elaborate the meaning of circular migration as the movement of back and forth between 
countries:64 “the to and from movement between two places, [this movement] includes more than 
one return [to the place of origin]”. Its design suggests that migrants can travel or live abroad in 
several countries of destination before returning once more to their country of origin. 
They denote circular migration is not restricted to bilateral movement between countries of 
origin and a single destination country. Over the last years, debates and studies at academic and 
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institutional level have increased around the definition of circular migration, and on the forms it 
should take. 
International organizations and development agencies have also renewed calls for 
arrangements of temporary migration. In this regard, supporting the idea of circular migration, Nina 
Glick Schiller and Thomas Faist argue, ‘highly skilled’ are transferring their skills from North to 
South and from West to East (Brain gain) rather than furthering the diminution of ‘talent’ in the 
South (brain drain).65 Theoretically, this may appear a sound argument, with all its pragmatic 
adversities. However, circular migration appeals only for an exclusive geographic migration 
phenomenon, in this case South-North. What about the south-south labor migration, especially 
migration from the poor south and east to the rich gulf countries? One may argue migrants in the 
gulf countries are often hired on temporary basis anyways. But the truth is they end up working 
often until retirement on temporary basis. In addition, they are often mistreated, at times physically 
abused and wages denied.66 Therefore, placing the focus only in the North-South migration 
phenomena, is quit unfortunate. 
The migration development debate mainly focuses on the implication of South-North 
migration phenomena; often in the interest of receiving countries. Most migration researchers 
happen to be northerners; it becomes least surprising when southern countries become subjects of 
study with little interest on the long-term implication of migration for their development. The fact 
that, we have no conclusive theory in this discourse, is perhaps testament to the lack of interest by 
wealthy western academic institutions. 
Hence, I disagree in the over emphasis placed on circular migration as a win-win approach 
in the migration-development debate. I should admit receiving countries could enjoy some benefits, 
but that benefit should not be at a huge cost to an individual’s immigrants’ life. Migrants should 
not be subjected to forced mobility. Their dream of establishing a settled life should not be 
disrupted by policy makers’ decision making.  
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Most of all, playing a meaningful role in the enhancement of home countries local economy, 
requires strong financial resource, which is hardly possible to accumulate without staying for a 
lengthy period of time in exile. Especially the relocation for married couples may even occur to be 
more challenging. Children having grownup abroad and started schooling there, relocation could 
be a bad experience. 
In addition, the recipient countries benefit from their talent, while offloading them to their 
home countries around retirement age, avoiding payment of pension benefits later. Therefore, I 
would argue that, this approach mainly serves the interest of the Northern countries, almost at a 
zero cost to their economy. 
Engaging Diaspora 
A more successful method seems to be the creation of an attractive social, economic and political 
environment in the homeland that restore trust among migrants in the state, and that would motivate 
them to remain engaged in their origin countries, to return and circulate, and to make social and 
economic investments.67 These days, sending countries are gradually abandoning the ‘brain drain’ 
assertiveness by trying to keep the skilled at home, and while embarking upon policies celebrating 
emigrants as valiant citizens, as they seek to encourage them to direct financial resources 
homeward, in the form of remittances, taxes and investment.68 
Emigrants themselves have increasingly assumed political roles in their origin countries, 
and some states are recognizing their double belonging gradually introduced dual citizenship rights. 
However, Norway remains reluctant in allowing its immigrant population to have dual citizenship, 
without which I argue, their engagement with the homeland is most likely to be curtailed. Diaspora 
engagement is the most viable approach for home countries to utilize their contribution in their 
development endeavors. 
                                                          
67 Thomas Lacroix, “Migration and Development Research scoping study” (Governance and Social Development 
Resource Center: 2008): 9; available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00820370/document; site accessed 05 
March 2016.  
68 Ibid. 
37 
 
Conflicts, Refugees, and Migration 
Ninna Nyberg Sørensen argues, development, politics, migration and refugeeness are integrally 
linked. 69 Economic disparities between developing and developed countries have long been seen 
as key determinants of migration. Within migration studies, security related inequalities between 
developing and developed countries contributing for migration have been studied less 
scientifically. 
For a period longer than migration as such, states have regarded refugee mobility as a 
political and security issue that needs international agreements.70 According to Leoscher and 
Milner, international political concern for the destiny of refugees first appeared after World War I, 
when huge refugee flows due to the breakup of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, and 
Romanov empires in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East. Russia and from the Russian Civil War, the 
Polish Soviet War, and the Russian famine of 1921 exacerbated inter-state tensions. This also 
endangered the security of European countries. Consequently, within the League of Nations, an 
international framework of institutions and agreements was created in 1921.71 
In the course of the Cold War, the political and security viewpoint on refugees was 
universal: they were understood as part of the struggle between the East and the West. In regions 
of intense superpower struggle and competition, refugees were armed, and their military cause were 
supported not only materially but also ideologically.72 Therefore, throughout the Cold War, 
refugees and safety problems they raised were considered to be part of a wider set of geo-political 
consideration. 
Many Eritreans came to the United States and Europe during the cold war period, as a result 
of the civil war between the two rebel factions, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Simultaneously, civilians were also escaping from the ravaging 
civil-war with the Ethiopian government. An Eritrean scholar Petros Tesfagiorgios argues, siting 
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the case of Eritrean Refugees in the Uk, by stating in the early 70s and 80s refugees were far better 
treated and accommodated than today: 
Refugees were treated sympathetically and political parties were active in raising 
awareness and understanding among their constituencies of the issues refugees faced. 
Institutions which supported refugees were close to the refugee communities. They 
worked in partnership to capacity build, train and empower refugee communities. There 
was affirmative action in education, housing and other social services.73 
Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen also denotes nowadays, there is a general 
unanimity that, since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have taken new forms, in which civilians 
are seen as important constituents of warfare rather than simply subsidiary to it.74 Faist and Schiller 
also agree on the change of perception on migration in the post-Cold War era, when the security 
implications of forced migration gained more salience.75 
These days, there is a growing common acknowledgement among European states and 
North America, that refugee movements not only are a consequence of insecurity but could also be 
a cause of instability for host countries, countries of origin, and regions in conflict and could even 
pose a danger to wider international peace and security. On 13 November 2015 a terrorist attack in 
Paris caused the death of more than 130 people. A Syrian passport was found near the body of one 
suspect for the terror attack. The man was alleged to have interred the country posing as a refugee 
amidst the hundreds of thousands of refugees entering Greece from Turkey.76 Incidents of terrorist 
attack are creating a backlash among European Union member states, often fail in harnessing a 
common strategy to deal with the migrant crisis. Hence, there is a growing debate among policy 
makers and analysts on the role of states in respecting international humanitarian obligations in 
protecting refugees, while keeping their security intact from any infringement by terrorists who 
could pose as refugees.77 
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Poverty and Migration 
Before discussing the link between poverty and migration, it is important to define poverty. In 
1995, more than 117 countries met in Copenhagen, for the world summit on poverty, and adopted 
a declaration, a program of action to alleviate and eradicate poverty. During this summit, they 
classified poverty into two categories as ‘absolute poverty’ a condition characterized by severe 
deprivation of basic human needs such as food, safe drinking water etc. But ‘overall poverty’ is 
defined as lack of income and productive resources to insure sustainable livelihoods.78 However, 
poverty is largely defined by the United Nations as multi-dimensional, as it includes lack of 
political participation: 
Fundamentally, poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human 
dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not 
having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to, not 
having the land on which to grow one’s food or a job to earn one’s living, not having 
access to credit.  It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, 
households and communities. It means susceptibility to violence, and it often implies 
living on marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water or sanitation. 79 
From the above perspective, poverty is not only lack of basic human needs and income, but 
it could also be a denial of choices and opportunities, by implication lack of political participation 
and freedom. Rightly so, when people are denied freedom, their enthusiasm for a better future 
evaporates, forcing them to move elsewhere in search a better life or resort into taking up arms to 
remove incumbent governments.  
However, how exactly is poverty related to migration? Hugh Waddington and Rachel 
Sabathes-Wheeler argues; poverty and vulnerability are likely to have two inconsistent effects on 
migration, by providing motivations to migrate, either as a strategy for income diversification or 
out of destitution; but also by reducing the ability to migrate because the transfer costs involved in 
terms of physical, financial and social capital are too high.80 The inconsistency is well observed; 
the level of poverty determines either as a push factor for people to immigrate in the hope of a 
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better life or people might be forced to stay at home simply because they couldn’t afford the 
expenses. This is particularly true when the migration is from south to North, but may not be the 
case in the south-south migration phenomena, where the cost is relatively low.  
The likelihood of earning poor income is also a deterrence, unless migration is precipitated 
by conflict. This is particularly true in the case of Eritrean refugees, after escaping to neighboring 
countries, spend thousands of dollars often to smugglers in reaching destination countries, mostly 
Europe. The expected reward is perceived worth the risk involved and it could mean death while 
crossing the Sahara Desert or the Mediterranean Sea. This is of course, excluding the real treat of 
hijack by Islamic extremist groups in Libya, who often decapitate their captives.81 
However, people in developing countries need capitals as well as networks to engage in 
international migration. Van Hear and Sørensen argues, there is no direct link between economic 
development, population growth, poverty, social and political change on one hand, and 
international migration on the other.82 Consequently, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-
reducing strategy.  
Migrants as ‘Development Agents’ 
Faist and schiller argue, today migration has mutated from being a problem for economic 
development to being a solution.83 This means the assertion that development failure produces 
international migration has given way to ‘new mantra’ that is, migrants may help to advance 
economic development in their countries of origin. Hence, the classical focus in migration studies 
on the causes and side effects of population movement has changed to a focus on the type of 
migrants and migration that will enhance development. 
Migrant Remittance 
Recent available census data from the World Bank disclose that, the number of international 
migrants is estimated at 247 million in 2013, significantly larger than the previous estimate of 232 
million, and is likely to surpass 250 million in 2015.84 Remittances sent by migrants to developing 
                                                          
81 Youtube, “Video: Islamic State Executes Ethiopian Christians in Libya”; available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m88nsKqBPwY; site visited 02 May 2016. 
82 Van Hear and Sørensen, “The Migration Development Nexus,” 5. 
83 Faist and Schiller, Migration, Development and Transnationalization, 7. 
84 The World Bank, “Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook, Special Topic: Financing for 
Development”; (The World Bank Migration and Development Brief No. 24, 2015); available at 
41 
 
countries is projected to have reached $436 billion in 2014, a 4.4 percent increase over the 2013 
level. With the exception of Europe and Central Asia, where remittance flows restrained due to the 
deterioration of the Russian economy and the devaluation of the ruble all developing regions 
recorded positive growth. 
Kim Knott and Sean Mcloughlin argue, brain drain is increasingly justified by alluding to 
the development impact of remittance, which flow to the global south.85 Obviously, from the 2015 
World Bank report one can understand remittances remain a key source of funds for developing 
countries, far exceeding official development aid and even foreign direct investment, excluding 
China. In addition, the World Bank report also stress that, the Global Economic Prospects for 2015 
indicated that remittances were also less volatile than official aid flows. 
The African Development Fund also acknowledges the fact that remittance is getting larger 
than the official development aid given to poor African countries.86 But, could remittance deliver 
sustainable development as much as it is hoped by policy makers? As far as my knowledge is 
concerned there is no verifiable evidence to support this assertion. Nevertheless, one cannot deny 
the visible impact of remittance for individual households.  
As I have discussed earlier remittance alone can’t guarantee sustainable development. 
Development can only be materialized when remittance is utilized efficiently with a grassroots 
based policy approach, that demands an enlightened manpower and visionary leadership, resilient 
to external intimidation by neo-liberal forces. Without governments in poor countries playing an 
active role in mobilizing resources, investing in education and public infrastructures, the dream of 
sustainable development could be hard if not impossible to materialize.  
Another prevalent assumption in the migration and development literature is that, migrants 
and their families do not often invest their money efficiently but rather spend their money on 
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consumption, such as imported consumer goods, and on nonproductive enterprises such as 
housing.87 This is a sound assertion, the disposition of money alone can’t bring development, not 
only results in misappropriation of money but also creates more inequality. In his vital review, M. 
Lipton underscores that recipients use remittances first to pay off debts incurred in paying 
migration cost or for education of their children. More than 90 percent of remittances are spent on 
everyday consumption.88 I also agree with his statement, most consumption activities only serve to 
strengthen status, such as high payments for dowry prices, feasts, funerals and the construction of 
pretentious, luxurious houses. Moreover, remittances may also be directly used to finance the 
migration of other family members. This is often the case in the Eritrean diaspora in the west, as 
success sometimes is measured by the number of close family members one manages to finance 
for their resettlement to the West.  
Main Gaps in Migration and Development Studies  
Schiller and Faist argue, the topic of migration and development is becoming an important field of 
study, yet there are many unanswered questions.89 They underscore that the notion and paradigms 
underlying the study of migration and development is asymmetrical and the idea of mutual transfer 
of resources that accompany migration are deeply flowed and continue to reflect the interests of 
the global north, the most powerful states, and the globe-spanning institutions that serve their 
interests.  
Thomas Faist a renowned scholar on issues of transnationalism, raises some critical 
observations on the ways in which development studies have approached migration. He discloses 
that migration and development discourses generally take the global south as the object of 
development, obscuring the transnational flows of labor and capital to the north, which serve to 
develop that region.90 Largely migration is studied by western scholars and its outcome often serve 
western interest.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RELEVANT  LITRATURE  ON  ERITREAN  DIASPORA  AND 
HOMELAND  DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses literature written in the context of Eritrean immigrants in other European 
countries. The role of Eritrean diaspora in relation to the homeland and the challenges of long-
distance nationalism is addressed. Eritrean diaspora character as promoters of peace or conflict, is 
discussed in light of existing intercommunal divisions.  
Theoretical Framework on Diaspora and Homeland Relations 
Over the last two decades the concept of “diaspora” has become a flamboyant subject for 
researchers and policy makers. Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain state, numerous researchers tried to 
define the “diaspora” concept, and a number of them have concentrated on its impacts in the host-
land or homelands’ socio-economic life and politics.91 However, these days, the interest in 
investigating the diaspora has shifted towards understanding, “diaspora’s role in conflict and 
conflict resolution”. This topic has become particularly important after the end of the Cold War 
and, more recently, after 9/11. 
In research of armed conflict, scholars debate on the influence of diaspora on civil wars in 
their home countries. Many scholars state that diasporas are especially prone to political extremism 
and use violence to resolve political disputes. Jonathan Hall and Ashok Swain argue, remaining in 
the homeland and experiencing the dreadfulness of war sobers earlier idealistic goals of gaining 
territorial sovereignty or state power and tempers rather than aggravates tensions between groups.92 
Those who left their country during civil wars, however, avoid the deterrent costs of war. Once in 
exile diasporas are empowered by economic gains and by the freedom to pursue extremist agendas. 
Other scholars however, counter argue that diasporas are working to promote peace and in conflict 
resolution in their home countries. 
Thus far, it seems like two opposing views dominate the study of diaspora behavior, that 
means, classifying the diaspora as good or bad, peace or conflict promoter, spoiler or peace maker. 
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Actually, it is not so simple to tag any diaspora group with one of the labels. It very problematic to 
assume that one diaspora group has one common point of view as diasporas are not homogeneous 
groups, and they have their own divisions.93 However, this has not deterred some from perceiving 
diasporas as reckless and unfathomable long-distance nationalist groups, with more negligible 
ideas than homeland policy makers, and that they are obstinate when it comes to making 
concessions on sensitive issues.  
Baser and Swain in another paper titled ‘diaspora as peace makers’ argue that diasporas may act 
as bridges between their host-land and homeland, making it easier to bring a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict in the homeland. As the diaspora have the leverage to lobby to both sides and they also 
have the capacity to be highly effective on post-conflict reconstruction.94 It should be stated that in 
studying diaspora behavior, it is extremely hard to come up with a universally applicable 
framework. However, majority of the studies on diaspora politics put weight on its conflict 
promoting character.  
Background History to the Conflict in Eritrea 
Similar to most of African States, Eritrea’s existence as a nation was precipitated European 
colonialism. The Italians colonized Eritrea from 1889-1941. After the defeat of Italians in World 
War II, the British Military Administration(BMA), controlled Eritrea for 10 years.  In 1950 the 
United Nations approved a resolution (390AV), federating Eritrea with Ethiopia against the stated 
wish of the people.95 Ten years later Ethiopian Emperor Hailesellasie powerfully annexed Eritrea 
to Ethiopia. The war for independence from Ethiopia started in 1961, and after 30 years, the war 
ended with the demise of the Mengstu Regime in Ethiopia, eventually, Eritrea formally declaring 
its independence via referendum in May 24, 1993. 
Nicole Hirt, a notable researcher on Eritrea states that, in 1994, the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF), a guerrilla organization which mainly led the fight against Ethiopia, 
renamed itself to People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), without making any significant 
change in its Maoist ideological organizational structure.96 She further notes the ruling party 
(PFDJ) set out guidelines for Eritrea’s future, taking a cautious path to democratization, however, 
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its vision never came to realize. She further states, EPLF/PFDJ ideology is mainly molded by the 
President Isaias Afewerki’s own worldview and has a strong Maoist principle by emphasizing on 
self-reliance. Tekeste Negash, a prominent exiled Eritrean scholar counter-argues, EPLF had never 
believed on democratic values from the outset, the very nature of the guerrilla organization could 
not allow for a functioning democratic institutions to flourish. Negash predicted on the challenging 
road ahead for the nation: 
For many years to come, the government in Eritrea would remain under the firm control 
of the EPLF(PFDJ), a military organization which owed its success to the barrel of the 
gun rather than to the ballot box. The transition from a liberation army in power to a 
political party is painful and in the best of circumstances it might take up to a generation 
to accomplish such a process.97 
Negash’s statement sound prophetic, 25 years after independence, the political elite in 
Eritrea seem to have no desire of democratization. One the contrary, the president turns out to be 
increasingly authoritarian. Today Eritrea is the only country in Africa without an independent 
media and a constitutional government, nicknamed by many writers as the ‘North Korea of Africa’. 
Throughout the armed struggle, the EPLF did not receive assistance from either Eastern or 
Western Block. The Eastern Block sided with then Marxist Ethiopian government and the Western 
Block was deterred by the ideological orientation of the EPLF from giving them assistance. This 
state of isolation led to two structural characteristics of the current Eritrean regime, one that insists 
on ‘Self-reliance’ with deep suspicion to the international community and on mobilizing diaspora 
Eritreans as a funding source.98 
The Eritrean Diaspora 
In order to understand the socio-political scenario in the Eritrean diaspora, it is necessary to 
understand the different generation of refugees. There is a wide gap in the understanding of the 
social reality in Eritrea between these generations. Tesfagiorgis, classified Eritrean diaspora groups 
into three phases, based on the period of escalation of the civil war and the post-independence 
political development that consequently prompted for the massive flight of people into exile.99 I 
found his classification methodology interesting, but his elaboration was too patriotic. Stated below 
is discussions of his outline. 
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First Phase: 
Around 1967, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)100 strengthened its activities in the Eastern and 
Western lowlands of Eritrea. Emperor Haile Selassie responded with a “scorch the earth” policy, 
as a result of the bombardment many villages destroyed and many people killed. This has resulted 
in the displacement of 30,000 people - mostly nomads and peasants, escaped to the Sudan. 
Second Phase: 
As the repression mounted, and the Guerrilla war intensified. By 1977 the two fronts, EPLF and 
ELF controlled almost all of Eritrea, with the exception of the capital Asmara and few other towns. 
Paulos argues the involvement of the Soviet Union changed the game on the ground. He notes, the 
Soviet Union decided to intervene in the conflict supporting the Marxist government in Ethiopia 
(Derg),101 the situation on the ground changed dramatically. In 1977-78 empowered by the 
purchase of modern armaments from the Soviet Union, the Ethiopian government launched a large-
scale offensive and regained most of the territories it lost. The attack was accompanied by random 
air and artillery shelling of more than 100 villages. Consequently, this heightened conflict triggered 
the outflow of thousands of people from the cities and rural areas to the Sudan, and from there 
many spread to the rest of the world. 
Third phase 
After Eritrea’s independence, in Ethiopia a new government led by the Tigrean Peoples Liberations 
Front (TPLF) took power. The two countries ceased their hostility and built a close relationship 
using the same currency. The resolution of the conflict via referendum and the reconciliations that 
followed was acclaimed by many observers.  Paulos further rightly argues on the high expectation 
from President Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. He states, 
they were considered as progressive young leaders, hoped to deliver their people from wars, 
poverty, ignorance, bring peace, progress and prosperity. The International community was 
convinced that an African renaissance was on the making. Gaim Kibreab also elaborates the state 
of the relationship between the two countries was developing towards integration: 
As recently as July 1996, the president of the Provisional GoE was quoted as saying that 
both governments were developing their relations where boundaries would be 
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meaningless. The Eritrean Ambassador to Ethiopia was even more explicit. In a recent 
interview he stated that, “forming an independent state was never the ultimate goal of our 
long struggle.102 
However, all these dreams were dashed when war erupted between the two countries over border 
town of Badme in May 1998. Escalated into an all-out conventional war claiming the lives of more 
than one hundred thousand from both sides.103 Although the two leaders signed an agreement to 
stop the war in December 2000, the two countries remain in a state ‘phony war’ as the no war no 
peace standoff continues. The Ethiopian Government refused to abide by the decision of the Border 
Commission.104 
The situation was further exasperated when in September 2001, the government imprisoned 
high ranking government officials, after calling for reform. This was followed by the crackdown 
on independent media, the then flourishing independent newspapers were closed, their editors 
imprisoned. Fourteen years after, none of them appeared in any court of law, condemned to 
languish in prison indefinitely. 
The Eritrean government used the no war no peace stalemate, in justifying the long overdue 
demobilization of the national service conscripts. Consequently, the conscripts who were supposed 
to serve for a year and half, held hostage a never-ending military service, debilitating their 
productive age. Increasingly disillusioned, thousands of them started leaving the country in droves. 
As the political developments continued to go from bad to worse, many young people 
feeling hopeless continue to escape largely to the Sudan and Ethiopia, often at a huge risk to their 
life. A commission of inquiry appointed by the United Nations warned that the dire situation in 
Eritrea can no longer be ignored and called on the UN Human Rights Council to uphold close 
inspection on violations committed in Eritrea that may constitute crimes against humanity.105 Mike 
Smith, Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, stated “the number 
fleeing from such a small country – estimated at 5,000 people each month – is forcing the outside 
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world to take notice,” Mr. Smith also stated further, the hopeless situation in Eritrea is exacerbating 
alarming exodus of refugees: 
“Eritrea’s dire human rights situation can no longer be ignored.  Imagine the impact of 
this uncertainty on young Eritreans who lose all control over their own futures. Is it any 
wonder that Eritreans – most of them young people – are the second largest nationality 
after Syrians to resort to seaborne smugglers to cross the Mediterranean to Europe?” 106 
According to the UN refugee agency, the number of Eritreans fleeing their country reached 
more than 400,000, almost doubling over the past six years. Based on this evidence, the 
Commission report, which was issued on June, 2015, stated “found that systematic, widespread 
and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed in Eritrea under the authority 
of the Government. Some of these violations may constitute crimes against humanity.”107 
Transnational Eritrean Diaspora 
The term ‘diaspora’ is often used to designate any immigrant group. These days it is usually 
contended that the term “diaspora” is losing its meaning as it became a broad concept that it can 
no longer be used to categorize specific communities. In the past, Jewish, Greek or Armenian 
groups were only referred as diasporas.108 In the current diaspora literature, one may find several 
definitions of diaspora putting emphasis on some features and eliminating or adding new ones to 
the definition. It creates confusion about the whole process of categorizing, which immigrant group 
is a diaspora and what are the criteria to distinguish them from other transnational networks and 
immigrant groups. Yossi Shain, defines diaspora as a group of people sharing common sense of 
national belongings: 
A people with common national origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent 
home territory. They regard themselves or regarded by others as members or potential 
members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing) a status held regardless 
of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country.109 
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From Shain perspective, one could also designate Eritrean immigrants in Norway as 
diaspora. However, the Eritrean diaspora is highly divided and polarized mainly on homeland 
political issues. Therefore, I would be discussing the role of Eritrean diaspora in Europe in the 
long-distance nationalism by reviewing some relevant literature. 
Long-Distance Nationalism and Divided Community 
Zlatko Skrbis, writes how long-distance nationalism could be a challenge to the host nation, when 
immigrants groups act non-responsibly in transnational activities: 
As a global phenomenon, long-distance nationalism has two important repercussions that 
make it worthy of study. In terms of domestic politics, this issue boils down to nation-
states now having to reckon with the non-responsible political participation of often 
unrealistic co-nationals living outside their political borders; this participation can reach 
toxic levels or assume corrosive forms in the modalities of money for certain political 
figures, nationalist propaganda, and weapons, although it can be restricted to the more 
benign activities of lobbying and fund-raising for humanitarian undertakings.110 
The Eritrean diaspora played a major role during the armed struggle, particularly the EPLF 
effectively used diaspora as a means of financial and material support. Hirt also argues due to the 
EPLF’s international isolation the front was financially mainly dependent on exiled Eritreans, who 
fled into exile from the atrocities of the Ethiopian regime.111 Accordingly, the front started to 
designate the existing nationalist organization in diaspora, especially Eritreans for National 
Liberation in America and Eritreans for Liberation in Europe, both associations raised substantial 
funds for the war effort. Hirt argues by 1980, the EPLF had become as a transnational organization 
encompassing central political body, a military apparatus, and mass-associations across the world. 
The arrangement of festivals and other events was an important instrument for creating cultural 
symbols and consolidating the links between the exiles and the EPLF. In 1989, the EPLF 
substituted the mass-organizations with supposedly apolitical community organizations, the so-
called “mahbere-koms”112 However, Khalid Koser argues it was done to limit their political 
influence on the emerging state.113 
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It is estimated up to one million Eritreans had been displaced from their territory during the 
thirty-year Struggle for Independence (1961–1991). The majority became refugees in neighboring 
Sudan, from where many have not yet returned. This chapter mainly focused on Eritrean refugees 
in Europe. Nadje Al-Ali and Richard Black states, there is no precise data on the size of the Eritrean 
populations in European countries, mainly because they were registered upon arrival as 
‘Ethiopians’ rather than ‘Eritreans’.114 
Post-2001 Diaspora and Structural Transformation 
Due to both the disappointing outcome of the war with Ethiopia that ended in 2000 and the 
postponement of implementing the Constitution, some group of Eritreans both from inside and 
outside the country voiced their concern.  Hirt writes, the diaspora was as disillusioned as the high 
ranking government officials, (who later came to be known as the Group-15) and the flourishing 
private newspapers.115 Internally, the government easily controlled the mass-unrest via 
imprisonment and liquidation. However, in the diaspora the situation was otherwise, opposition 
grew. Koser argues, it has not been possible for the state to use the same political pressure over 
diaspora nationals, as it does to those inside the country.116  He further argues, there is a notable 
contrast between the luck of public criticism of the government inside Eritrea and the quite open 
debate that take place within communities outside of Eritrea. Khalid has wrongly assumed that, 
diaspora Eritreans using their freedom abroad can influence the government to make political 
concessions. Diaspora based opposition groups persistent efforts and demonstrations failed to bear 
democratic fruit, neither the G-15 members or jailed journalists are yet to be freed. 
The government has effectively been ‘milking’ the diaspora irrespective of their nationality 
with the 2 percent income tax levied on all Eritreans abroad.117 Eritrean embassies around the world 
have been keeping a record of the exact amounts every Eritrean has paid since Eritrea’s 
independence.  
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Anti and Pro-GoE Groups 
Koser argues that, there has been political difference within Eritrea and in the diaspora which are 
merged around three main foundations.118  First, there are those supporters of ELF, an organization 
which started the armed struggle, however, it was effectively replaced by EPLF in 1981.119 
As a second factor Koser states, the remarkable sense of unity, though he mentions some 
tensions along ethnic lines. Regional mistrust exists among the Tigrigna speaking ethnic group, 
which is traditionally divided into three provinces namely Hamassien, Seraye and Akeleguzay. The 
mistrust is more visible in the diaspora. 
The third factor, due to the conflict with Ethiopia successful propaganda of the government 
created a sense of victimhood by the much larger, more powerful and internationally supported 
neighbor. However, Hirt describes Koser’s description of sense of unity as a ‘fiction’ and 
something long-gone.120 Hirt wrote her research paper in 2013 ten years after Koser’s paper. One 
can easily understand why Koser come up with optimistic conclusions, as during those days that 
was the overarching reality that Koser capitalized. 
However, today the political landscape of Eritrean diaspora has been completely 
transformed. Hirt claims, today the Eritrean diaspora is divided into four main groups: 
1.“Permanent exiles” (mostly ELF veterans), who did not return to Eritrea after liberation 
due to fears of persecution. 
2.Former EPLF/PFDJ supporters abroad who became dissidents and are now in a “second
 exile”. 
3.Exiled (former) members of the present government and the large group of youths, who 
left the country illegally as draft deserters, who can be called the “new exiles”. 
4.A group without – or with only loose – political affiliations that is now well‐
integrated in the host country. 121 
Opposition activities or former government supporters, get condemned by government 
supporters as ‘traitors’ when they voice their criticism, face social isolation and marginalization. 
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This is often used as a weapon of social control to silence people from standing against the 
government. Hence, there is a sense of fear in the diaspora, thousands of kilometers away from 
Eritrea, many Eritreans are still not yet free. Due to this peculiar phenomena, the case of Eritrean 
diaspora transnationalism has attracted the attentions of scores of researchers and analysts, over the 
last few years.122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 This chapter has helped me to answer the central research questions, as without understanding the complex 
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diaspora community. 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
UNDERSTANDING  MIGRATION  AND INTERGRATION 
Introduction 
This chapter presents, discussion on causes and consequences of Eritrean migration influx and their 
choice of Norway as a final destination, in light of push and pull migrations models. I have also 
examined homeland development in the context of integration.  
I had interviewed eight Eritrean informants and two Norwegians. Informant 1 and 6 are in 
their sixties, considered as part of the first and second phase of refugees, while the rest of my 
informants’ were part of the third phase, who arrived in Norway over the last ten years. Informant 
3 and 4 are women, while the rest were men. Informant 3,4,5 are university students. Informant 3,4 
and 7 are in their twenties, while informant 2 and 5 are in their thirties.  
Migration ‘for a Better Life’ 
Most journeys start with a dream and one step. Likewise, Eritrean refugees journey to Europe starts 
with a dream, a dream of a better life, freedom, dignity and prosperity. Some of my informants 
decided to leave Eritrea hoping one day to made it either to Europe or America. Some others 
especially minors followed others’ footsteps and ended up in Norway more by accident than by 
plan. Informant 5 is one such example, even though a University graduate, he was unprepared on 
the idea of where to seek asylum and neither did he knew about Asylum seeking procedures.  He 
elaborates on this point: 
When I first arrived in Europe, I came to Norway to see my sister. Some people 
encouraged me to seek asylum her, others suggested to move to England. Up to that point, 
I never knew about the procedures of seeking asylum, I was just thinking I could live and 
work anywhere without seeking asylum.123 
He was unprepared, his main obsession was to reach Europe. For some of my informants it 
appeared as a luxury choosing a country of asylum in Europe, while living in the refugee camps. 
But this mindset changes the moment they reach European borders, either through Italy or Greece. 
Coming from a country with a system of lifetime forced military conscription at meager payment, 
it is an unfathomable privilege.124 However, not for everyone, for informant 7, who came to Europe 
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via the Mediterranean Sea, Italy was never his ultimate destination. He made all efforts to avoid 
finger printing in the pursuit of continuing his journey to the rich North. On this point informant 7 
stated: 
I wasn’t risking my life and spending thousands of dollars just to come to Italy, and a day 
later to sleep on the streets. It was only in the hope of getting either to Norway, if not to 
the other Scandinavian countries. I knew while in Africa how bad the conditions in Italy 
were, though much better than staying in the refugee camp, but Italy is not worse the 
risk.125 
Informant 7 already made-up his mind about his destination country, while in Ethiopia. On 
the internet he discovered about the Norwegian Welfare System, and felt for people like him, who 
starts from zero, Norway would be an ideal place. He also got further information from his aunt, 
who lives in the country. In addition, the shorter asylum case processing time especially for 
Eritreans was attractive. He dreamt of continuing his study, even if it would mean struggling 
economically, education was worth anything for him. However, he knew beforehand about the zero 
tuition fee in the Norwegian higher academic institutions. A family reunion with his wife he left 
behind, was something he considered, and found that the Norwegian immigration process was 
conducive to make his dream a reality. 
My informant’s decision shows how refugees are particularly interested in finding the right 
place for their particular needs. There are also other factors at play, especially the role of established 
family members appeared as a solid ground in making the final decision. Almost all of my 
informants had established network of family members, before their arrival, something that helped 
them integrate faster. 
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Map 1: Source Council on Foreign Relations126 
 
Causes of Migration 
People move from one place to another for a variety of different reasons. There are multiple types 
of global migration phenomena, among them; forced, reluctant and voluntary. The involuntary 
relocations of Africans to the America’s during era of slave trade was a form of forced migration. 
People’s voluntary decision to migrate lured by the better economic prospect abroad, is regarded 
                                                          
126 Zachary Laub, “Authoritarianism in Eritrea and the Migrant Crisis” available at 
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voluntary. In the case of reluctant migration, there must be an unfavorable condition that force 
individuals to reluctantly relocate without their desire.127  
There is no active war in Eritrea, but thousands are leaving the country every month. In this 
case, I find it more fitting to frame the recent migration phenomena under reluctant migration, by 
examining with the push and pull migration models. But, if one doesn’t observe the push factors 
involved carefully, assuming Eritreans as economic migrants is quite possible. 
Like active war, serious human rights violations generate reluctant migration (refugees) 
creating the condition of a ‘push factor’. In the case of informant 2, 5 and 7, it was the indefinite 
military service which drove them to leave their home country. Informant 3 and 4 are pulled to 
immigrate by family reunion. However, the pull and push factors are closely interrelated, as we 
will see them in the case of Eritrean refugees.  
Pull Factor 
Security: The political stability and harmony in the Norwegian society attracted informant 2 to seek 
asylum and start a new life. He escaped from the national military service, and a secure life in 
Norway was more than anything for him. The stability of the country and its relatively few people 
attracted him most. He states on this point: 
While I was in Eritrea, I used to hear about the peaceful nature of the Scandinavian 
countries in general and Norway in particular. As living in peaceful environment was the 
most important thing for me, I decided to apply for asylum in Norway.128 
Prior to his coming to Norway, he was given protection in Germany on political grounds, 
but he opted Norway. From informant 2, we learn that good economy is not always a sufficient 
condition for refugees in deciding to relocate, he was also in search of inner tranquility.  
Family Reunion and Resettlement: Through the process of family reunification, children and 
spouses could legally immigrate to Norway. By the United Nations Resettlement Program, some 
refugees have been resettled to Norway directly from the refugee camps. However, none of my 
informants were beneficiaries of this program, but informant 3 and 4 came as part of family re-
union.  
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Both of them haven’t made the decision to come to Norway themselves, and both found it 
difficult integrating in the Norwegian society. Feeling socially excluded and lonely informant 4 
plans to return to Africa. She talks about her experience on the conflict between her expectations 
and reality:  
When I knew I was coming to Norway, I just imagined to find all the things that I used to 
see on Hollywood movies, but it was far from that. I still couldn’t adopt to the Norwegian 
life style. But, there are many other good things like freedom and educational 
opportunities.129 
Using the opportunity of free higher education in Norway, she is studying at the university 
with a goal of returning to Africa in an effort to contribute something towards the development of 
the continent. It was interesting that she never mentioned Eritrea but insisted anywhere in Africa. 
She feels less optimistic about going back to Eritrea any time soon, for her to contribute her part in 
its development endeavors. She stressed on the improvement of human rights in the country for her 
to consider going back home. She was not part of the military service herself, as she came to 
Norway as a teenager to join her parents. But, she witnessed the forceful conscription of young 
people from the streets of her neighborhood, and this has left her with a disturbing memory.  
She is not a refugee in Norway, which means she is allowed go back to Eritrea if she wants 
to. Nonetheless, she has no desire of going back. This is one such example how the push and pull 
factors are closely interlinked. But, she stressed on her plan of going back anywhere in Africa after 
finishing her study; this could be an ideal example of a reverse migration phenomena.  
Economic Opportunities: Many Eritreans could spend as much as 10,000 US dollars to reach 
Norway either via the Mediterranean Sea or Greece. The money is either paid by family members 
or borrowed from close relatives or friends. This financial burden preoccupies them with paying 
back their debts and eventually helping fellow family members back home.  
Informants 7 came to Norway through the Mediterranean Sea and the prospect of good 
economic opportunity in Norway was an important factor in his decision. His immediate concern 
was helping his family back home, whom he left in a state of desperate economic situation. He 
hoped that the high-income and good standard of living in Norway could make his dream come 
true.130  
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Push Factor 
Insecurity: UN investigative committee on the human rights situation in Eritrea describes the 
country as ruled by fear than by the rule of law.131 This deplorable state of human rights situation 
forced informant 2, 5 and 7 to leave the country. When talking about the lack of freedom, each one 
of them stated lack of different aspects of freedom, which closely affected their life. Informant 2 
talked more about the lack of freedom of speech as he left the country around 2002, one year after 
the government closed all the private newspapers. Informant 5 talked about the lack of freedom of 
religion, as he belongs to the now barred Pentecostal church, where members are subject to 
imprisonment if caught worshiping in house churches. Informant 7 emphasized the lack of freedom 
of movement, that led him to abandon his dream of opening small business. These are fundamental 
human rights and their absence naturally create a perfect condition for a push factor in deciding to 
leave a country.  
Some of my informants have experienced imprisonment, others were simply scared of 
facing the same fate at some point. Some had seen close family members disappear by security 
agents. This sense of insecurity and vulnerability by the lack of the rule of law, pushed them to 
seek a better secured life abroad. Such experiences are traumatic, eventually forcing them to leave 
the country before facing the same destiny. On this point informant 7 states: 
When I was in college, security agents took away some of my colleagues simply for asking 
critical questions to the administration. And no one heard of them ever since. From that 
moment on, I was so scared if I was going to be the next person. Eventually, I started 
contemplating to leave the country before it was too late.132  
Indefinite National Service: Eritrea has a system of national military service, initially it was meant 
for a year and half, when it started 1994. But, after the end of the war with Ethiopia, the government 
abandoned a demobilization program and instead launched operation Warsay Yikalo forcing all 
conscripts to continue their service indefinitely. Informants 2, 5 and 7 were members of the national 
service.  Informant 5 served in the military for five years at meager payment getting equivalent of 
$15 a month. This state of hopelessness forced him to seek refuge in the Sudan. He states on this 
point: 
National service program is not peculiar for us; it is also practiced by other countries. 
However, ours is unique once you get in, there is no way out. How could someone accept 
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a situation like that, it is slavery in disguise. As an adult instead of me taking care of my 
aging parents, I was forced to be dependent on their financial assistance to meet my basic 
needs, nothing could be more humiliating than this.133 
This state of endless national service made them hopeless, restless and with no dream of 
enjoying a normal life, establishing their own family, living in freedom. Spending years in the 
military service means their productive years in life wasted in vain. The only hope left was realizing 
those dreams outside the country, consequently, precipitating massive-migration.  
Family Disintegration: The state of indefinite national service meant economically impoverished 
young male and female can’t get marry and those who marry can’t live with their family leading a 
settled life. Children of national service conscript are mostly raised by single mothers, seeing their 
father on rare occasions, often once in a year. Therefore, the number of minors coming to Europe 
without a guardian in search of asylum is increasingly growing.  
As more and more young people are desperately leaving the country, the prospect of 
marriage for young girls inside the country increasingly diminish. Especially girls are more pushed 
to immigrate by the poor prospect of marriage factor, as we can learn from informant 3. She told 
me many young girls are getting desperate in finding someone to marry.134  As a result they too 
decide to leave the country in the hope of finding a suitable partner, which can guarantee them a 
secure life outside the country. The migration via marriage is done in two ways, either in Eritrea 
marrying with someone from the diaspora or in neighboring countries mainly Sudan and Ethiopia. 
Informants 3 further elaborates the prospect of marrying someone from the diaspora is much higher 
outside the country. As most of the young diaspora Eritrean refugees cannot enter Eritrea due to 
legal restrictions and possible reprisals by the government, they find it convenient to marry either 
in the Sudan, Ethiopia or in some cases in Uganda. Eventually, they rejoin later via family 
reunification.  
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Minors: In 2015 alone, over 5000 minors sought asylum in Norway, four fold to the previous year. 
Likewise, the number of Eritrean unaccompanied children was also recorded the highest.135 The 
government was unprepared and overwhelmed with the huge inflow of minors seeking protection, 
as they demand more care than adults. 
This huge arrival led the Norwegian authorities to send a delegation to Eritrea, headed by 
the former State Secretary in the ministry of Justice Jøran Kallemyr to talk about possible 
repatriation of failed asylum seekers.136 After his trip to the capital Asmara, Kallemyr gave positive 
remarks about the country, arguing that comparing Eritrea with North Korea was unfair. However, 
he came under heavy criticism from Norwegian institutions that advocate refugee’s rights. 
Municipalities across Norway are working in protecting and integrating the refugees in the 
host society. EMbo Stavanger is part of the settlement program for unaccompanied refugee minors 
in Stavanger. EMbo consists of a child welfare institution, residential living/group homes and 
smaller apartments, where the unaccompanied minors get close follow-up according to their needs.  
Hanne Visdal-Johnsen, professional development leader in EMbo Stavanger, stated that the 
institution sheltered 40 youth (in March 2016) out of whom 14 were from Eritrea. She states, some 
of the unique phenomena among Eritrean minors is the experience of imprisonment, torture, and 
hardship in Eritrea and on their way to Norway. This has affected their educational performance, 
with some suffering from complex trauma. The institution, however, provide care and gives 
counseling support, in an effort to help them maintain a healthy approach in life.137 
UNICEF’s research in 2010, on the reasons for migration of unaccompanied children from 
Afghanistan concluded minors were sent by their family for economic reasons.138 Consequently, 
some Norwegian medias citing UNICEF’s report claimed, “minors in Norway were starving 
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themselves in an effort to save money to send to their families back home.”139 The question is, is 
the UNICEF’s report relevant for Eritrean minors? 
Informant 7 stated that, the state of indefinite national service in Eritrea affected minors 
enormously.140 They often end up being raised by single mothers, enjoying little adult comfort and 
security. They lost a role-model both at a family and society level and often they desperately cross 
the border either to Ethiopia or Sudan alone. Therefore, the majority of minors in Norway come 
from refugee camps in Ethiopia and Sudan and many of them came to Europe through Libya 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea.  
Visdal-Johnsen states that, some children under EMbo Stavanger including Eritreans send 
money to their parents in Eritrea.141 She understands their concern, and underscores it is within the 
law if they do so. She argued, “some unaccompanied minors send money, primarily to pay back 
smugglers and if they fail, their family could be threatened. Moreover, they came from a society 
with different social values, where social solidarity is much stronger than the one we have in 
Norway.”142 
The family in the homeland does not understand what it means to live in Norway. They 
often hear unrealistic stories like, everything is fantastic, you get a house, education, a car and 
money fall from the sky. However, the reality is otherwise. Refugees go through a very difficult 
process of integration, which is very demanding in itself. In addition, they have to go to school. In 
some cases, their families back home ask them money, and this pressure affects them 
psychologically. Visdal-Johnsen elaborates on this phenomena:  
They feel bad, I am here living good life but my families are struggling; I am living a 
decent life but I have no enough money to send them. Some have enormous economic 
pressure. We as a society expect them to go to school, learn Norwegian, integrate, to have 
free time and friends. They are exposed to unprecedented pressure, unfortunately which 
is very tough. I admire them, as leading a normal life amidst all this pressure is a real 
challenge.143 
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Remittance and Illegal Migration 
Most of my informants came to Norway using either smugglers via the Mediterranean Sea or 
through airports often using fake passports. However, as legal channels of migration increasingly 
get tightened, the dream of reaching Europe through legal means has become a distant dream for 
many. Hence, the only available option remains using smugglers at great personal risk, that 
involves payment of thousands of US dollars. But, where does this money come from? 
None of my respondents paid the money for smugglers themselves; they either acquired it 
from their family members or relatives often in western countries. However, smuggling involves 
several stages and methods. It starts from Eritrea, as the government impose shoot to kill policy for 
anyone attempting to leave the country illegally.144 Informant 7 indicated that, in 2014 people could 
pay approximately from $3000-4000 to smugglers to cross the border either to Ethiopia or to the 
Sudan.145 When they safely reach in the refugee camps, diaspora remittance becomes their only 
source of survival. 
Hopelessness in the camp generates anxiety, bleak future and eventually people attempt to 
secure money for further smuggling to reach Europe. Expenses are relatively less from Sudan than 
embarking from Ethiopia. Smugglers demand more than $1500 only from Ethiopia to Sudan.146 
From there, other smugglers take over and demand an additional equal amount. From Libya, it 
costs around $2000 to reach Europe. In this case, this life-threatening route could cost as much as 
$10,000, an expenses that has to be paid by someone from the diaspora. 
But, not all my informants had the privilege of getting financial assistance from close family 
members abroad. In this case, relatives back home could borrow the money for smugglers on 
condition of reimbursement after reaching the destination country. For the family, successful 
relocation of one of its members to the West offers economic guarantee. This phenomenon 
reaffirms the new economic migration theory that states, the decision to migrate is not individually 
based but on the family at large. In guaranteeing good economic future both for themselves and 
their family members back home, many prefer asylum countries with good future economic 
prospects.  
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Hostage and Ransom 
The journey from Eritrea to Europe not only demands enormous financial costs, but the risk 
involved could be life threatening. The danger starts from Eritrea, due to existing shoot to kill 
policy. Crossing the border illegally could cost escapees their life. If caught, they could end up 
getting killed or serve years of imprisonment in the country’s underground prisons, in what 
Amnesty International described “unimaginably atrocious conditions.”147 Those crossing the 
border to either Ethiopia or Sudan, may physically be safe but continue to live in limbo, without 
adequate food and a future to dream of. 
Smugglers, through their underground agents in the camp, often lure desperate refugees 
into taking the dangerous journey to Europe, by feeding them false information. In the process, 
many become victims of human trafficking, they might be sold from one group to another, and 
have to pay thousands of dollars’ in ransom. In this case, informant 7 elaborates his personal prison 
experience: 
We were sold by the smuggler to the Islamic State groups in Libya, and they hold us 
hostage for four months. They tortured us (the men) badly, while raping our women in 
front of us. As a result of that experience, I am still suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.148 
One-woman detainee managed to sneak in a mobile phone, and eventually relatives in the 
diaspora were informed of their whereabouts. The group demanded $3000 for the release of each 
hostage. My informant paid the money with the help of his aunt in Norway. She earlier covered his 
expenses from Ethiopia to Libya, remitting a similar amount.149 
Understanding Integration 
Once asylum seekers get accepted as refugees, the Norwegian government provides them with an 
introduction program, where they learn language and social studies about the Norwegian society. 
If their request for asylum fails, they could end-up in limbo locked in reception shelters, in such 
cases, their role for homeland development is almost non-existent. Therefore, it is important to see 
homeland development in light of integration.  
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As explained in the second chapter, some of my informants have lived in Norway for over 40 years, 
others as short as two years.  Their understanding of integration greatly varies with the duration of 
their stay in the country. I have categorized Eritrean refugees in three phases as per their timing of 
departure from Eritrea, as explained in chapter four. There is no visible contradiction between the 
first and second phase of immigrants in their understanding of integration. However, there is a wide 
gap with the third phase.  
Informants 1 and 6 belong to the first phase of refugees, and both feel closer with the 
Norwegians society than with the recently arriving refugees, although, harbor strong homeland 
sentiments. Both are active in the opposition movements, in removing the homeland government. 
Meanwhile, both of them were also active in the Norwegian politics, with informant 1 even serving 
as a member of city council, for the city of Stavanger for four years. Ever since he came to Norway, 
worked with Norwegians and he was deeply impressed by their honesty. He believes he knows 
their behavior well and took all their good moral values. He elaborates how much he has changed 
as a person after he became a member of parliament: 
I worked as a member city council for the city of Stavanger for four years. I learned how 
to talk properly, how to respect others even if you don’t agree with their opinion. Even if 
you distaste homosexuals but you respect them and discuss issues together. Therefore, I 
now consider my four years working experience as a member of parliament, just like 
someone, who graduates from four years of study at the University. 150 
Provided the system of ‘dictatorial’ government changes in his native land, he aspires to 
share his experience to fellow compatriots especially on how a democratic system of government 
functions. He feels his homeland needs this culture badly in order to achieve sustainable 
development in the long-run. Schiller and Faist coined such an activity as ‘social remittances’ such 
as the transfer of human rights, gender equity, and democracy from North to South.151 
 However, in the context of an undemocratic government in Eritrea and as long as hostile 
policy exist towards diaspora nationals, immigrant’s individual skills remain an untapped resource. 
Hence, the theory of circular migration in this case is only applicable to labor migrants. As long as 
the statuesque in the homeland remains unchanged, Eritrean diasporas are largely limited in 
survival remittance.  
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There exists contradiction between the first and third generation immigrants in 
understanding integration. Informants 5 lived for seven years, feels not yet integrated as he finds it 
hard to fit in the Norwegian society.152 Informant 4 and 5 consider moving out of Norway for good, 
after finishing their study or after becoming naturalized Norwegian citizens, for that would enable 
them to stay outside Norway indefinitely. They plan to relocate either to Africa or United States. 
Both stated social exclusion as the main reason for leaving. Informant 5 who has lived in Norway 
for seven years, plans to move out of the country. He elaborates his experience on integration 
process as problematic: 
I have learnt a lot about the Norwegian society at school; I learnt the language, but I don’t 
feel I am integrated even after seven years. The main problem starts from the definition 
of the word integration itself, we differ in how we understand it. In our society we have a 
close relationship with our neighbors, here it is different. In the Norwegian culture it is 
quite normal to have a neighbor that you don’t know. This is quite unusual for us; 
therefore, I could not see myself as part of the Norwegian society. 153 
However, informant 1, feels more integrated and have more in common with Norwegians 
than with his fellow countrymen. He counter argues,  
The perception of Norwegians as individualists is wrong, as they too socialize with their 
neighbors, perhaps it may not be to the same degree as we (Eritreans) know it in the 
context of our society, but judging all Norwegians in one blanket of ‘individualism’ is 
unfair. 154 
We can learn from both examples how understanding of integration greatly varies between 
the first and third generation of refugees. The length of stay in Norway significantly influenced 
their sense of belongings in the host society. The lesson that we can draw from this comparison is 
that, integration could take time and failure in integration could lead to further migration in search 
of a new home elsewhere.  
Integration and Homeland Development 
Several migration scholars have surveyed the ways that migrants remit and how remittances impact 
on community development, economic structure and relations between genders and family 
members.155 The study drew attention to migrants’ economic contributions and perhaps increased 
policy makers’ interest in migrants’ role for the development of sending countries. But how is it 
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possible without successful integration, especially in the labor market, for immigrants to play a 
vital role for homeland development? In this regard, integration and homeland development 
remains mutually inclusive. But, what exactly do we mean by integration? 
Different scholars interpreted the concept of integration differently, Rinus Pennix defines 
the term as, ‘the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals 
and as groups.’156 His definition is broad, and rightly so as different countries interpret integration 
differently. The Norwegian authorities’ definition of integration is more explicit. The Directorate 
of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) defines integration stressing on the need of working and 
language skills: 
The main objective of integration policy is that immigrants and their children shall use 
their resources and contribute to the Norwegian community. The keys to integration in 
Norwegian society include participating in working life and have a good knowledge of 
Norwegian.157 
No matter how we understand integration, its mutual benefit for sending and receiving 
country is undisputed. Integration failure has several ramifications. It leads to the social exclusion 
of immigrants, eventually becoming a burden for the host country. Consequently, without 
successful integration, migrants play a limited role for the homeland. Without sustaining 
themselves economically, their ability to remit to the homeland remains minimal. The more 
immigrants successfully integrate with the society, the more likely are they to contribute for the 
homeland, with financial and social remittance, as I would discuss in the next chapter. 
However, the path for integration is not smooth for everyone, especially for failed asylum 
seekers from Eritrea. It could mean a life on hold, locked indefinitely in reception shelters. The 
Norwegian government has no repatriation agreement with the GoE, and UNHCR strongly opposes 
deportation of failed Eritrea asylum seekers.158  
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Yemane Teferi, a failed Eritrean asylum seeker in Norway died in January 2016 after living 
almost for 20 years in asylum shelters.159 The majority Eritrean asylum seekers get protection, but 
those who do not, like Yemane end up in a limbo. His death, attracted both Norwegian and 
International media’s attention that covered extensively his plight and tragic death. He told to the 
Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang(VG); “let alone helping my family back home, I am a dead 
man walking, living without any hope.”160 His brother in Eritrea expressed, how Yemane felt 
humiliated for not helping them. He pointed out, Yemane distanced himself from his family back 
home, calling them only on rare occasions.161 
The state of failed asylum seekers inexorably Yamane summarized with one statement, “If 
I die now, I lose nothing, because I own nothing.”162 His death might have deeply affected his 
family, however, neither sending nor receiving country benefited from his grueling life in limbo.  
Transnationalism 
Valentina Mazzucato notes that, “studies on migration and development singly focus on one-way 
flows: what migrants do for the home country. However, there are also flows that go in the other 
direction, from home country to receiving country. These flows are usually ignored by migration 
and development studies”.163 As Mazzucato’s well observation denotes academic literature 
weighted more focus on the role of migrants in the development of home countries, paying little 
attention on the ‘two-way flow’, neglecting migrants influence to host countries.  
Transnationalism was devised as a concept in the early 1990s to bring these two research 
fields to bear on each other. It was noted that migrant realities could only be understood by taking 
the linkages between home and host countries and the simultaneity of flows with which these 
linkages are produced and sustained into consideration. 164 
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From my fieldwork homeland affairs or state of close family members profoundly 
influenced my informant’s daily life in Norway. The experience of informant 7 perfectly 
exemplifies how ‘simultaneity’ affects migrant’s engagement with the homeland and its impact on 
integration with the host country. He had lived in Norway for two years; and from the start he faced 
a lot of challenges. His experience of seeing the death and torture of his fellow countrymen in 
Libya, profoundly affected him psychologically, suffering from PTSD.165 In addition, his wife and 
sister were refugees in Ethiopia depending on his remittance for survival. His other sister too 
escaped to the Sudan with her husband and two children. To make matters worse, he also heard of 
his father’s imprisonment in Eritrea, who was the only bread winner for the family and no one 
heard of him ever since. His older brother too got detained accused of attempting to leave the 
country illegally, and in prison he developed a mental illness. Amidst all these tragedies, my 
informant had to deal with his own PTSD. He felt better after receiving medical assistance, but his 
path for integration was proven to be difficult. He elaborates on this point: 
When I go to the language school my body was in the classroom but my mind was absent. 
I often flash back to Africa. I couldn’t concentrate well to run my daily life and this greatly 
derailed my integration.166 
Such episodes are particularly not uncommon among the newly arrived refugees, often 
impede them in integration. As I discussed in chapter three, individual immigrants’ role as survival 
mechanism for remaining family members back home in the context of Eritrean refugees is evident. 
The conflict of adjusting two places and cultures is very demanding for recently arrived refugees 
(perhaps in the range of ten years.)  
The first generation had lived in Norway for over forty years, and brought most of their 
close family members to either Norway or other western countries. Even though, they were 
politically active against homeland government, unlike the third generation they faced much less 
financial burden. Informant 1 and 6 stated that, most of their family members have left the country, 
and feel less financially burdened in helping relatives back home. This shows how transnationalism 
is stronger in newly arrived refugees than other immigrant groups. In this case, that the more family 
members one helps to resettle to the west, the less financial burden he/she might encounter over 
the long-term.  
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Globalization and Virtual Family 
As more and more Eritreans are leaving the country in droves, some of my informants’ entire family 
members are scattered throughout the world creating what I have come to refer to as a sense of 
‘virtual family’. Family disintegration has greatly diminished their contacts with the homeland, and 
as they are mostly linking with fellow family members in the West or other parts of the world via 
social medias such as Viber, Skype and Facebook.  
Informant 5 states that, all his family members fled into exile and now his contact with his 
relatives inside the country is greatly reduced after he found home virtually on the web. They have 
created a family group on Viber and Facebook, where they update each other on current family 
affairs. I found this both as an interesting, equally alarming phenomena. Because, in the homeland 
development debate, migrants’ link with fellow family members has been highlighted as one of the 
most significant elements. If connection with the homeland totally cease at one stage, it could signal 
the end of remittance, perhaps complete disengagements. In the absence of family connection, what 
factors will motivate the diaspora to play an active role for the development of the country? 
Informant 5 responded to this particular question, with cautious optimism, provided the political 
atmosphere in the country improves for the better, he hopes to return one day as an investor.167  
Virtual family is one of the most important findings of the project, attempts were made to 
find other relevant literature on this subject, but was unsuccessful.  
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Figure 2: My illustration on the evolution of virtual family in the Eritrean migration 
phenomena 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
CHAPTER  SIX 
UNDERTANDING  HOMELAND  DEVELOPMENT 
Before I started the interview with informant 6, he asked me about the title of my thesis. 
When he learnt that it had to do with the development of the homeland, he was stunned 
and replied ‘what development are you talking about?’168 I experienced similar sentiments 
from the other informants’ too, assuming there is ‘no development’ currently undergoing 
in Eritrea that one can really talk about. 
Introduction 
This chapter covers homeland development mainly in terms of economic and political aspects. In 
the first part, the role of Eritrean refugee’s financial contribution and the challenges involved is 
presented. The second part discusses the political activism by Eritrean refugees/immigrants in 
Stavanger in removing the homeland government and how this lead to intra-community divisions. 
The finding for the first and second part is based on the interviews with Eritreans and Norwegian 
informants.  
Homeland Development: What development? 
Most of my informants are preoccupied with the deteriorating political development in Eritrea and 
the huge refugee influx to Europe. These phenomena have affected them financially and 
psychologically. They hear the death of a close family member either when drowning in the 
Mediterranean Sea or when killed by the Islamists in Libya.169 In this context, my writing about 
homeland development could not make any sense to them. What they see is a tragedy unfolding in 
front of their own eyes, mass-migration triggered by the deplorable state of socio-economic crisis.  
However, there is a wide disagreement on homeland affairs between the old and new 
generation. Some of the young informants I interviewed; see their role as a means of survival for 
their family members back home, while the old generation see themselves as agents of democratic 
change. They are active in organizing demonstrations to pressure the government in Eritrea in 
making political reforms and freeing political prisoners. The youth are predominantly absent from 
demonstrations organized often by the old generation and consequently the old generation blame 
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the youth, as opportunists and unpatriotic. The first generation feels betrayed by the young ones. 
In this regard informant 1 states:  
Our generation has paid a lot of sacrifices to achieve independence, unfortunately the 
dream of establishing a democratic government has been hijacked. Now we are getting 
old, even if we want to do something, we can’t without the young by our side. But where 
are all the young people claiming asylum in Europe in speaking out against the injustice 
they suffered. This young generation is just self-seeking; I don’t think they have really 
understood what is at stake, the future belongs to them not to us.170 
The immediate priority of the young refugees I interviewed, was in integrating and finding 
a job, thereby to help family members back home. Informant 7 is one of the young generation and 
he is politically active. But profoundly discouraged by the ineffectiveness of diaspora-based 
opposition in bringing change in the homeland.  What I have observed was a sense of hopelessness 
among both generations. It is this state of frustration that is exacerbating the accusation and 
counter-accusation between the two generations. The big question is however, who is responsible 
for the failure and disintegration of the opposition block?  
Democracy and Development  
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines democracy as “a form of government in which people choose 
leaders by voting”.171 In this case, leaders are chosen by people, and they are expected to serve 
their electorates interest. If they fail to do so, they risk being voted-out in the next term. Democracy 
empowers electorates by allowing them to guide their future destiny. In this case, development 
endeavors without engaging the masses at the grass-roots level is most likely to fail. No matter how 
top-down approach of development seem to work for the short-term, its long-term sustainability is 
unreliable. In this case, democracy and development remains mutually inclusive.  
In the absence of democracy in Eritrea, my informants agree they could not effectively 
participate in the development endeavors of their country. Currently they see their contribution 
mainly on the significance of remittance ‘as a survival mechanism’ to family members back home. 
However, for a long-term sustainable development, informant 1 argues, establishment of an elected 
government is a precondition.172 In this case, being politically active is seen as a way of facilitating 
long-term sustainable development. Provided, democratic government is put in place, informant 5 
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intends to return back as an investors and informant 1 as an agent of social remittance, sharing his 
experience on democratic governance. However, informant 2 has no intention of returning, even if 
there would be a democratic government in place. The reason he stated, “I am going to feel a 
foreigner; I don’t think I will be reintegrating with the society I grew up.”173 
For long-term sustainable development, some of my informants engage in political 
activism. But not all of them have the same understanding on this issue, as some of my informants 
are not politically active. Those who are active participate in demonstrations condemning the GoE, 
attend meetings and fund-raise for the opposition medias. They also mobilize fund for international 
demonstrations, often by buying airline tickets to individuals willing to participate.  Most of them 
do so to fulfill their moral obligation, as “silence in the face of injustice amount to dreadfulness”.174 
Informant 6 has lived for over forty years in Norway and elaborates on the change of culture in the 
Eritrean society: 
During the Hailesilase and Mengstu regime, people were speaking up and the regimes 
were admitting their faults. But nowadays, whenever you see evil, it become a norm to 
remain silent. In my opinion, such an attitude reflects some people were only obsessed 
with achieving independence, that is why they don’t care now, whatever tragedy happens 
they just keep a blind eye.175 
The polarized state of the Eritrean diaspora discouraged many in resorting to remain silent, 
as I would discuss later in the chapter. Informant 4 is a young woman, who tried to engage first on 
the side of the government, then changed her position after increasingly getting frustrated by the 
worsening human rights situation in Eritrea. She tried to play an active role with the opposition 
before she gave-up. When she explained why she distanced herself from both groups, she states: 
 Lack of unity made the situation more complicated. People are divided, and often settle 
disagreements with insults and infighting. The old generation only inherited us their 
antagonism and narrow-mindedness. The Young People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (YPFDJ)176 too inherited this poison of divide and rule, everywhere you go, it is 
just disgusting.177 
The lack of tolerance and respect for people with different political views is mentioned as 
one of the main factors for the division in the opposition block, leading many to distance themselves 
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from actively participating. Respect and tolerance are the main pillars in democracy, and informant 
5, who is passive from political activism, accuse the opposition block of his reluctance to join them 
‘they too are behaving in undemocratic fashion’.178   
Divided Community 
Two major groups, anti and pro-GoE actively engage in homeland politics abhorring hostile 
relationship. Supporters of the GoE once in a year invite a cultural troupe from Eritrea, named 
‘BDHO’ and spend night-out partying. Anti-GoE activists see such events as a means of mobilizing 
financial and moral support to the sustenance of ‘a dictatorial government’. For this reason, they 
work hard for the cancelation of such concerts. Initially, they disseminate information highlighting 
the nature of the concert to town halls owners and hotel managers, arguing money raised from the 
concert would ultimately serve to strengthen a dictatorial government in Eritrea. Doing so, could 
implicate them in indirectly funding a government condemned by the international community, for 
its poor human rights records, ultimately damaging their own reputation.179 
Most often they succeed, if such efforts fail to bear fruit, the next step becomes 
demonstrating in front of the planned concert hall, something hotel managers want to avoid. At this 
stage, often confrontation erupts between the two groups and in some instances, things go out of 
control, demanding police intervention.180  
Anti-homeland government groups use the local media effectively in raising awareness 
about the situation in the homeland. Pro-GoE, seem better organized than the anti-GoE groups, 
pro-GoE are however, often absent from the local media. Even when they come under a barrage of 
criticism, they refuse to divulge information to journalists.181 Anti-GoE, usage of the local media 
consequently won them ‘sympathy’ from some local Norwegian politicians and other individual 
actors, with some even playing a prominent in the awareness campaign. One such example is, Finn 
Våge, chairperson for the Eritrea committee (Eritreakomiteen). Våge states that, the committee’s 
main objective is, “to inform and raise awareness about the plight of Eritreans both in Norway and 
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Eritrea, to expose the network of support for Eritrean government and to support Eritreans working 
for democratic change through peaceful means.”182 
Våge writes critical articles for a local newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad, exposing the 
implicit support by some members of the community to the GoE. In one of his articles, he criticizes 
pro-GoE groups for inviting a propaganda rock band from Eritrea: 
Eritrea's dictator sends this year a Christmas present for Eritrean youth in Stavanger! The 
gift is a rock band from Asmara packed with nice music. They will celebrate a dictatorship 
that UN accuses of committing crimes against humanity. These Eritrean associations 
invitation of the band, reaffirm their support for a violent dictatorship. The leaders of these 
associations are well aware that it would be "suicidal" to admit that they are in favor of a 
dictator. Therefore, they only deny in public their support to PFDJ regime, the only legal 
party in Eritrea.183 
He also urged local politicians to pay a particular attention to the gross human rights 
violations in Eritrea by bringing data from the 2015 report by the Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights on Eritrea184 by stating:  
Opposition is being shattered and the youth forced into a modern-day slavery by having 
to undergo military service or forced labor indefinitely for 5,10 or 15 years! UN accuses 
the country of systematic and deliberate violations like torture, sexual slavery, forced 
labor and deliberate-murder. It concluded that Eritrea is governed not by law but by 
fear.185 
All of my informants agree, unless the military service ends unconditionally the youth will 
continue to escape and the country’s socio-economic state will continue to get worse. This state of 
abject poverty will exacerbate mass-migration towards the West, and the burden on diaspora 
Eritreans would upsurge accordingly, as refugees eventually would depend on their remittance to 
survive along the way. This ‘hopeless’ situation creates a polarized atmosphere among the pro and 
anti-GoE groups. Due to divisions of political opinion, diaspora Eritreans reach as far us breaking 
all social ties, including close family members. One of my informant elaborates on this point: 
Over the last 24 years, our society has been spoiled. The major organs that sustained our 
society for generations are now broken. This is mainly due to lack of education on the part 
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of the youth, therefore, an uneducated society’s contribution in the enhancement of 
democratic culture is limited. Due to lack of knowledge, we see today pro and anti-GoE 
individuals break social ties. I personally experienced it, people whom I had good 
relationship with, when I spoke out against the regime in the media, they right away 
distanced themselves from me. I don’t blame them; it is just because they don’t know any 
better.186 
The tension between these two groups impeded the creation of a solid diaspora organization 
that could have influenced the GoE to change its policies and eventually mobilizing resources to 
the benefit of homeland communities. The role of Eritrean immigrates as development agent is 
greatly derailed by the lack of political participation and hostile approach by the GoE. For any 
meaningful development endeavor, in this case, democracy remains a prerequisite. As long as the 
current stalemate persists, diaspora Eritreans will continue to resort in resettling fellow family 
members to the west. Perhaps this may even more exacerbate exiting intra-community tension in 
the host country, while gradually diminishing diaspora’s contact with the homeland.   
Two Percent (2%), Diaspora Tax 
The GoE has a system of levying a 2% income tax to its diaspora citizens living abroad, often when 
renewing passports or ID cards, a scheme heavily criticized by the UN and some Western 
governments.187 In December 2011, a UN security council resolution 2023 (2011),  called on 
Eritrea to “cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes 
outside of Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent”.188 In a letter to the 
UN committee in July 2014189 the GoE stated that the Proclamation specifically targets only 
Eritrean citizens in the diaspora, not citizens of other countries of Eritrean decent. 
The Eritrean National Assembly enacted the 2 percent Rehabilitation and Recovery Tax 
Proclamation in 1994. 190  The legislation was enacted to “provide some cushion to the hefty annual 
                                                          
186 Interview with informant 2. 
187 Sam Jones, “Diaspora tax for Eritreans living in UK investigated by Metropolitan police”, available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/09/eritrea-diaspora-tax-uk-investigated-metropolitan-
police; site accessed 18 March 2016. 
188 United Nations, “Security Council: Resolution 2023 (2011)” available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2023(2011); site accessed on 18 March 2016.  
15 March 2016. 
189 United Nations, “Letter dated 10 October 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to 
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security 
Council”, available at  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2014_727.pdf; site accessed 15 March 2016.  
190 Ibid. 
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budgetary bills that the Government continues to shoulder to date to support the war disabled and 
the families of martyrs. Some of my informants strongly oppose this system of extortion and lobby 
to the Norwegian government to prevent Eritreans in Norway from exploitation by the government 
in Asmara. As Eritrea doesn’t have embassy in Norway, one has to refer to the Embassy in 
Stockholm for any consular services. 
However, informant 1 claims the embassy has clandestine agents in major cities across 
Norway, engaged mainly in facilitating the transfer of the 2% income tax to the GoE.191 Eritrean 
governments’ extortion of 2% tax is a source of tension in the diaspora community. Supporters 
argue, the money is meant to serve for the development endeavors of the homeland, while 
opponents counter-argue, such assistance could only further delay democratic change by 
strengthening a dictatorial government. In this case, homeland development is subject to 
disagreement, eventually becoming a source of intra-community conflict.  
The Eritrean diaspora organized two major demonstrations in 2014 and 2015 in Geneva 
and New York respectively, calling for UN to impose sanctions on the GoE for its human rights 
violations and demanded the complete halt of the 2% tax.192 Their effort was paid-off as the UN in 
2015 decided to extend the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea, to investigate if 
crimes against humanity is committed.  
Survival Remittance  
Remittance is one of the most important influences refugees and other migrants can make towards 
countries of origin. There is growing evidence that remittances are crucial to the existence of 
communities in many developing countries, including many which have suffered conflict and 
produced refugees.193 Remittances are transfers of money from individuals in one country to an 
individual in another country. The majority of such transactions involve small amounts of money. 
                                                          
191 Interview with informant 1.   
192Fatma Naib, “Diaspora Eritreans rally against human rights abuses”; available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/diaspora-eritreans-rally-human-rights-abuses-150626011455681.html; site 
visited 18 March 2016. 
193 Nicholas Van Hear, “Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and conflict”; available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-diasporas-remittances-development-and-conflict  site visited 15 
March 2016.  
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However, for households in receiving countries remittance may represent an important share of 
their budget.194 
 The war with Ethiopia and its aftermath deprived Eritrea of its key economic role as the 
external trading outlet for the Ethiopian hinterland. In addition, a very large section of the 
productive population remains tied up in compulsory military service or so-called national 
development programs (Wefri Warsay Yikealo). This has affected food production, exacerbating 
shortages, in the meantime, major international aid agencies close down offices in the country.195 
But Eritrea’s economy has not buckled. With increasing isolation, it continues a policy of 
economic self-sufficiency. Defying the logic of the so-called Washington Consensus, it restricted 
free enterprise and tightened state control in all aspects of its economy. Exasperated by Eritrea’s 
difficult policy environment, most of the international donors and non-governmental organizations 
have left. 
Since 2003, the Eritrean government is not disclosing official economic data. However, it 
is clear that remittances are fundamental to the current Eritrean economy. Sally Healy elaborated 
on David Styan’s argument, that Eritrea was unique in both the scale and the level of control the 
government exercised over remittances. Eritrea’s exports are officially worth only $20 million 
(prior 2007) while imports are $700 million. There are adequate reserves to cover just two weeks 
of imports. This highlights the crucial importance of maintaining the flow of remittances, upon 
which all aspects of the economy, including government finances, depend.196 
Healy argues, the GoE is able to extract extra remittances from diaspora when ‘smuggling’ 
their relatives out, and they then have to pump more remittance in order to avoid elderly dependents 
being arrested or starved. Meanwhile, the GoE knows that those youths who do ‘escape’ will 
themselves begin remitting, simultaneously increasing financial flows into the country, while 
decreasing demographic and political pressures at home.197 
                                                          
194 Carlos Vargas-Silva, “Migration and Development”; available at 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-primers/migration-and-development; site visited 18 March 2016. 
195Sally Healy, “Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007. The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2007; 5, available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/200407eritrea.pdf; site visited 15 
March 2016.  
196Ibid.,6. 
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From my fieldwork, I have noticed newly arrived refugees seem more overburdened with 
remittance. Meanwhile, they don’t have permanent jobs or solid income. The first generation 
refugees that I have interviewed, brought earlier most of their immediate family members either to 
Norway or to other western countries.  
With increasing numbers of Eritreans leaving the country becoming the norm, some UN 
estimates put the number at high as 5000 every month, the financial burden for refugees in the west 
dramatically increase. Informant 7, who arrived in the last two years, elaborates the daunting 
challenge of remitting every month: 
Whatever penny I get from the Norwegian government, I have to remit it to my siblings 
in the Sudan, Ethiopia and to my parents in Eritrea. I couldn’t eat what I want and buy 
cloths. If I could, it must be from Fretex.198 I live for them; their survival has become my 
ultimate objective. So far, I remitted more than one hundred thousand Norwegian kroner 
in just under two years, mostly to Ethiopia and Sudan.199  
Unlike economic migrants’ remittance, which often directly reach homeland societies, 
refugees remittance more often is destined to neighboring countries, where large group of refugees’ 
are sheltered. Despite their poor economic standing, refugees’ are more likely to engage in 
persistent remittance than economic migrants, largely due to the precarious nature of fellow family 
members in protracted refugee camps. However, it is neighboring countries that harvest the benefits 
from the injection of hard-currency. As a result, refugees’ role in the homeland development 
discourse via remittance seem to hold no water. Even if they do so, it is only meant to keep family 
members survive. Likewise, large part of the remittance from Eritrean refugees in Norway is spent 
on smuggling and survival purposes. 
Remittance Transaction  
On November 3rd, 2015 the GoE announced issuing a new currency note and that Eritreans had 
only six-weeks to surrender old currencies in exchange for new one (Nakfa) at a 1:1 ratio.200 
Officially and semi-officially four main reasons were given, to fight the black market, control 
inflation, to increase currency circulation and to fight contraband and corruption. However, 
different writers and commentators gave varied explanations, on why the GoE made such a 
decision. 
                                                          
198 A place where second-hand clothes are sold at a low meagre price. 
199 Interview with informant 7. 
200 Shabait, “Legal Tender Nakfa Currency Notes Regulations”; available at http://shabait.com/news/local-
news/20720-2015-11-05-12-26-32 site visited 17 March 2016. 
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International money transfer agencies such as Western Union, MoneyGram, Forex etc. are 
non-existent in the country, pushing diaspora Eritreans to use other informal means. My informants 
often remit via individuals living in the West. They transfer the money to an individual’s bank 
account, and his/her agent inside the country receive it in Nakfa, at a black market exchange rate. 
This is done in clandestine; as the government severely punish individuals engaged in the exchange 
of hard-currency in the black market. Possessing undeclared a penny of dollar alone could send 
someone to indefinite imprisonment.201 Informant 6 also stated that, the closed nature of Eritrea’s 
economy to the outside world made it even more difficult for the government from earning benefits 
of hard currency from its own citizens abroad.202 
However, the change of currency made it very difficult for diaspora Eritreans to remit even 
via the unofficial channels, as the government imposed restrictions in the amount of money people 
could withdraw from the banks. In this point informant 7 elaborates, on the challenges he faced in 
remitting after the change of currency: 
It took me four months to remit to my mother. She was so frustrated and complained if I 
had abandoned her, as she couldn’t understand how remittance transfer has been 
complicated. The government is not helping us, they first kicked us out and now denying 
us from helping our family.203 
In the course of writing this thesis the statuesque remained unchanged, increasingly 
frustrating my informants after finding it difficult to support their family members. Even if they 
manage to send, it was almost at less than half amount to the previous exchange rate. Before the 
change of currency, one dollar was exchanged at black market rate ranging from 40 up to 45 Nakfa, 
but from January 2016, it went down as low as 20 Nakfa creating an additional financial burden to 
the diaspora. 
Remittance and Social Conflict 
World Bank in its 2015 report on Eritrea states that, the last household survey and Participatory 
Poverty Assessment undertaken in 2003, estimated that around two-thirds of the people were living 
below the poverty line.204 This state of abject poverty created family members’ dependent on 
persistent remittance from relatives abroad. This has also contributed in the breakdown of social 
                                                          
201 Interview with informant 2.  
202 Interview with informant 6.  
203 Informant interview 7. 
204 The World Bank, “Economy”; available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eritrea/overview; site visited 
March 18, 2016. 
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relations among close family members. In some cases, it even let into marriage breakdown. When 
family members struggle economically back home, diaspora couples are obliged to support them 
financially. If the couple’s economic standing is pitiable, it may leave them in frustration and 
depression. In this case, informant 3 explains: 
Both mine and my husband’s parents are in Eritrea. They depend on our financial support 
to survive. However, this has seriously weakened us financially, and the hardest part is 
that, there is no an end in sight to this impasse. We are forced to take this burden as part 
of our life now. I would have liked to continue my education but who’s going to feed my 
families. It is a very difficult situation.205 
Part of Eritreans social culture is the norm of helping family and vulnerable close relative’s, 
but when these expectations are not met, it often results in social relations breakdown. Some of my 
informants have helped family members and relatives to reach Europe by covering the partial or 
full expenses of smuggling. However, they often end up without ever hearing a message of 
gratitude afterwards. Normally there is no financial reimbursement among fellow family members 
or relatives, but there is a high degree of expectation for recognition and reassurance of social 
status. However, this is not without disappointment, as informant 6 elaborates: 
 Many lie to get financial support, they tell us we are imprisoned, tortured and when you 
help them to come here, they never say even thank you, they even distance themselves 
from you. How could you help others again?206  
Lobbying 
As discussed in chapter four, diaspora homeland engagement is not always development oriented, 
at times diaspora groups could also be sources of conflict and instability in the homeland by funding 
warring parties. For instance, during the period of Eritrea’s armed struggle for independence (1961-
1991), the diaspora played a key role as the main source of funding for the guerilla fighters, who 
were rarely receiving help either from the Western or Eastern bloc. 
The role of individual diaspora actors was crucial for the successful conclusion of the war 
and Emnetu Tesfay, is one such example. He came to Norway in the mid 1970’s, spent most his 
life actively engaging in mobilizing resources, fundraising, exporting technological knowhow, 
lobbying, writing project proposals and creating awareness campaign on the ‘noble cause’ of 
Eritrea’s armed struggle, often by writing articles in local newspapers. He also travelled around the 
country giving speeches in schools and colleges campuses. Consequently, he played a significant 
                                                          
205 Interview with informants 3 on 20 November 2015. 
206 Interview with informant 6. 
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role in winning sympathy from the Norwegian public in general, and from politicians in the left in 
particular. 
In the 1970’s there were not many Eritreans in Norway, and Norwegians knew little about 
Eritrea. In less than a year after he came to Norway, he wrote an article on the National Newspaper 
Dagbladet entitled “The Norwegian Connection,” an article that brought Norwegian’s attention 
and eventual sympathy on the conflict in Eritrea. In the article he argued that, Eritreans were forced 
to wage war against Ethiopia, due to the decision made by the Norwegian delegations’ 
recommendation for the eventual unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia.207 
By resolution 289 A(IV), the General Assembly, adopted on 17 November 1950, among 
other things, the establishment of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea to ascertain more 
fully the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea and the means of promoting their future welfare.208 
The UN sent its own mission of enquiry (with Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and South 
Africa as its members) to Eritrea in the same year. The mission, which stayed in Eritrea from 9 
February to 9 April, failed to reach a common accord in presenting their findings to the General 
Assembly, despite the fact that, a majority of the Eritrean people clearly wanted complete 
independence.209 
Reading Tesfay’s article, many Norwegians felt guilty and saw the problems in Eritrea as 
their own fault. Leftist political parties became the first and main sympathizers of Eritrea’s cause 
for independence, even though slowly other parties joined later. Norwegian politicians also used 
Tesfay’s arguments in convincing their electorates.210 
After this episode, Tesfay learnt that, he could do anything in mobilizing further support 
for the guerilla fighters, and he was even tempted not to continue studying or start working. He 
was also undeterred by his poor state of health, as he was suffering from chronic diabetes, falling 
down at times, while fundraising on the street. His doctor once advised him to take care of his 
health and his response was staggering: 
                                                          
207 Interview with Emnetu Tesfay, 15 January 2016.  
208 United Nations Archive, “United Nations Commission for Eritrea”, available at 
https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Finding%20Aids/2015_Finding_Aids/AG-048.pdf; site visited 
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‘I told him that my friends are dying in the fighting, and likewise I see this work as my 
own fight. I will not stop because of my poor health issues. The doctor was surprised and 
told me ‘it is only when you are healthy, that you can help others’.211 
Everywhere he goes, he tells people about his country, its history, culture and society. Even 
after he started working, he used to spend 60% of his time working on projects related to the 
struggle in Eritrea. He studied several projects that could be useful for the armed struggle. Among 
the successful projects was the establishment of satellite transmission link between the liberated 
area in Eritrea and the outside world. He wrote, about this project on his personal website 
(emnetu.com): 
The link which provided telephone, telefax and telex lines facilitated easy and quick 
communication with the outside world. It surprised very many among others, Col. 
Mengistu Hailemariam who is believed to have angrily said “…they have even telephone 
link.” The BBC by itself was surprised when live information was supplied to it from the 
battle ground during the demise of the Ethiopian army in Afabet.212 
This is one example of how individual commitment for homeland development; could at 
times bear more effective result than an organization with dysfunctional bureaucratic structure. 
Tesfay also acknowledges, had he not been working individually, he might have accomplished 
nothing.213 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the summary of the main results of the research. The findings are presented 
in a categorical form namely; theoretical, political and economic dimensions.  In the end, 
implications of migration in relations to pull factor and reverse migration phenomenon are 
summarized.  
Theoretical Dimension  
There is now an increasing recognition that migration, both internal and international, can signify 
a major route out of poverty. Studies suggest that migration can have substantial positive impacts 
on livelihoods and well-being, though it also carries costs and risks that may be borne excessively 
by the poor, and may surge inequality if the risks are not well managed. Migration is considered as 
an unavoidable global phenomenon that needs to be better understood and managed. However, the 
relationship between migration and development has so far been described as ‘unsettled.’ 
As the field of migration development is getting more focus recently; equally association 
of migration with security is growing bigger than with development. The relationship between 
migration and development, particularly with conflict, is far less studied.  
The migration development debate has had a habit of shifting back and forth over the last 
forty years. This has produced, a wide theoretical gap in understanding the exact relationship 
between migration and development. Migration development optimists recently began to argue 
siting the benefits of remittance for homeland development, and conscious of this fact, homeland 
governments increasingly started to engage their diaspora by launching dual citizenship scheme 
and investment opportunities. The World Bank and African Development Bank also recognize 
diaspora as major homeland development actors, due to the huge diaspora remittance flow, often 
outweighing official development aid.  
Economic Dimension 
In the case of the Eritrean diaspora in Norway, my findings indicate that, a large part of their 
remittance is directed towards Ethiopia and Sudan, helping or smuggling fellow countrymen living 
in those countries as refugees. Remittance sent to Eritrea is often survival than investment oriented. 
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As there are no official international financial transactions in the country, no reliable remittance 
data is available. Due to these challenges, diaspora Eritreans resort to informal remittance channels. 
Thus, the government gets minuscule hard currency. Accordingly, classifying Eritrean diaspora as 
development actors remain unfitting or the concept of homeland development needs redefinition. 
In the Eritrean diaspora context, development could mean helping fellow family members resettle 
in the West, where immediate vertical economic uplift is expected. Consequently, economic status 
of family members in the homeland could change dramatically. Towards this end, tens of thousands 
of dollars are spent in smuggling, depleting diaspora’s financial resource. This endless state of 
dependence, at times leads to social conflict, in the worst case scenario family disintegration.  
 More remittance flow creates more inequality, prompting others to look to the West as the 
only escape route out of poverty. In this case, I am on the pessimistic view on the migration 
development debate; perhaps Eritrean exodus could serve as one worst case migration pessimism 
scenario. Migration leads to more migration; more brain drain leads to less democratization, 
eventually less development.  
In today’s Eritrea, everybody is escaping by paying thousands of dollars to smugglers, 
including underage children, many of whom ended up seeking asylum in a country as far as 
Norway.  
Political Dimension 
During my research, I had encountered some theoretical challenges in understanding migration 
development, in the context of unstable or undemocratic homeland government. Much of my 
discussion focused on political activism of diaspora Eritreans in achieving democratic change. 
Some of my informants were even puzzled by my research topic, finding it highly irrelevant with 
the current state of affairs in the country. They underscored that, there could not be any talk of 
development without democracy, accountability, and the rule of law. Homeland political issues are 
however divisive, polarizing, leaving pro and anti-homeland government groups in a constant state 
of confrontation. What most of my Norwegian informants asked was why Eritrean diaspora in 
Norway support, a dictator accused of serious human rights violations by the international 
community.  This is an interesting question and a potential topic for future master students or 
researchers. 
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The Wall Street Journal referred to Eritrea as one of the "world's fastest-emptying nations." 
Many writers described the state of Eritrean migration as ‘exodos’. The question is, why are they 
leaving? What is at stake? Two major factors are pushing Eritreans to leave the country; the 
institutionalization of indefinite military service and the lack of the rule of law. Eritrea’s national 
service is unique in its kind once you get in, you hardly get out, and this at a bare minimum wage. 
My informants described it as “slavery in disguise”.  
 National service created poverty and disintegrated families, discouraging many young men 
and women from establishing families of their own. Children are condemned to grow-up with 
single mothers, often struggling economically to make ends meet, as husbands are conscripts. This 
state of hopelessness leads young, old, married, single, and underage children into seeing exile as 
the only viable option for a dignified life. In today’s Eritrea, people could not dream of a future. 
This state of affairs resulted in migration exodus, with an epic-proportion, in the modern history. 
Endless mass-military conscription is the main source of mass-migration, creating not the classical 
condition of brain drain but Population Drain, adding a new buzz word in the migration 
phenomenon discourse.  
The lack of the rule of law in the country is also another contributory factor, leaving 
inhabitants to live in a constant state of fear. The Eritrean government has not implemented a 
constitution ratified in 1997, and for two decades the country is run by the president’s malevolent 
leadership. No election, no free press. Individuals survival depends at the sheer mercy of corrupt 
military leaders, who enjoy unlimited power at their disposal to disappear any individual deemed 
‘a threat’ to the government. People do not know prisoner’s whereabouts. If family members try to 
trace them, they risk ending up in incarceration themselves. This state of general lawlessness 
created a sense of profound fear and prompted many to escape the country in saving their life before 
it is too late.  Families are disintegrated throughout the world and some of my informants have 
created symbolic-home on the social media. They often meet with fellow family members scattered 
throughout the world by opening a family-group page in skype, Facebook and Viber. I have called 
this new phenomenon the-Virtual Family, an area that I strongly recommend for further research.    
Pull Factors and Reverse Migration 
When it comes to Eritrea refugees’ choice of coming to Norway, I discovered three pull factors 
namely, security, family reunion(resettlement) and good economic prospects. The experience of 
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insecurity in Eritrea attracts some of my informants’ the physical security in Norway as a major 
pull actor. Others, however, never made the decision to immigrate themselves but, were forced by 
the migration of close family member, joining them via legal means or were directly resettled from 
refugee camps. For others, Norway’s good economic standing, the welfare system, in particular, 
attracted them most. 
Most of the Eritrean immigrants, who came as refugees in the early period have a positive 
attitude about integration and social life satisfaction. However, new comers are constantly 
struggling to integrate and fit in the Norwegian society. Some are even opting to move elsewhere 
in the hope of discovering a meaningful life. In this case, integration takes time and not all refugees 
coming to Norway will eventually stay. Especially those with higher education are more prone to 
immigrate, as they see better job prospects abroad. However, those with less education are more 
likely to stay, lacking the confidence to adventure in starting a new life somewhere else.  
Final Reflections  
In the end, I would like to stress on the fact that, the state of migration from Eritrea is having a 
disturbing short and long-term consequence for the country and by enlarge to the international 
community. The consistent denial by the leadership in Eritrea on the leading cause of migration, 
denotes there is no desire to stop the exodus. For some of my informants, this is ‘a deliberate, 
systematic policy of the government to empty the nation of its young people’, who would unlikely 
return any time soon. This mass surveillance, conscription and mass-migration has largely enabled 
for the government to survive in power unimpeded, without facing massive popular uprising.  
Regrettably, the migration development optimism is not closely relevant to the state of 
Eritrea. But I have come to the conclusion that, had it not been massive migration that drained the 
youth and the educated class, the government might have not survived this far. Young people are 
agents of change, but in today’s Eritrea, instead of looking inward, increasingly they are looking 
outward for a better life, and only few make noise against the government from European and 
American capitals. Many Eritrean democracy activists innocently believe they could overthrow a 
dictatorial government unhinged in relinquishing power via demonstrations or exerting external 
pressure. I am firmly convinced; no exertion of external pressure would succumb the regime into 
making substantial domestic reform.   
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Twenty-five years after its liberation from Ethiopia, Eritrea fought with all of its neighbors, 
internationally isolated, it earned the name “North Korea of Africa”. Disillusioned Eritreans are 
voting with their foot crossing the border to Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti living as destitute 
refugees. The UN states that, five thousand leave on a monthly basis, a frightening statistic for a 
country of less than five million. The country is facing an existential threat. It needs a savior, but 
as long as Eritreans continue to see migration as a solution, they will continue to be saved in the 
Mediterranean Sea. If the current tide of migration, continues unabated, what is at stake is not Brain 
Drain but Population Drain. (END) 
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Interview Consent 
 
Project Title: Migration Development: on the case of Eritrean immigrants in Norway 
Background and Purpose 
This master’s research paper is self-funded and deals on migration and development, on the case of Eritrean 
immigrants in Norway.  The main purpose of the research is to understand how Eritrean immigrants describe 
their role for homeland development. How do they contribute or participate in the affairs of their homeland. 
This project is for the partial fulfillment of my master’s study in the School of Mission and Theology 
in Stavanger.  
What does participation in the project imply? 
You are chosen to participate in my study and feel free to decline my request.  
The main source of the data for this study would be interviews with Eritrean refugees living in 
Norway and Norwegian actors working with refugees. 
  You could be asked about your personal life story i.e how you came to Norway, on integration 
with the Norwegian society, your social relationship with fellow Eritreans immigrants in Norway, and your 
ties with your homeland.  
What will happen to the information about you? 
 The data gathered via interviews will be recorded and transcribed. The data will be used as a source material 
for the above-mentioned project.  
The Personal data will be treated confidentially. Besides me, no one will have access to the data. 
All information will be stored in my personal computer at home, which is password protected. In addition, 
codenames will be used in storing the data. The list of names will be separately kept from the data.  
 I will use tape recorder and hand written notes while the interview is underway. The duration of 
the interview could approximately take from thirty minutes to one hour, but the interviewee could stop at 
any given time. 
After the successful completion of the project, the master thesis will be delivered to the School of Mission 
and Theology in May 2016. There will not be any mention of name, time, age and place of residence of 
respondents. Your personal information will be kept anonymous. Participants will not get recognition in the 
publication of the paper.  
 
Voluntary-participation 
It is voluntary to participate in the project, and you can at any given time withdraw your consent without 
stating any reason.  
Consent for participation in the study 
 
 I have received information about the project and I am willing to participate.  
 
----------------------------                                           ------------------------------------- 
Place and date                                                                 signature  
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Interview Guide:  
 Semi-structured Interview 
 
1. Can you tell me about your background i.e. how you grew up?  
2. How did you come to Norway? Follow up questions…. for example, what were the 
challenges along the way? 
3. What did you know about Norway before you came and where did you get the information? 
4. Have you made personal decision to come to Norway, if yes, why? 
5. How was your experience in integrating with the Norwegian society? Follow up questions, 
have you faced any challenges? If yes, what were the challenges and do you feel you have 
overcome those challenges? 
6. Do you feel that you have changed as a person after you came to Norway, if yes, in what 
regard?   
7.  How do you describe your relationship with your fellow compatriots in Norway? Follow 
up questions, how often do you meet and Why?  
8. How do you maintain your relationship with your relatives in Eritrea, how often do you 
visit and in what ways do you contact them?  
9. How do you describe your role for homeland-development? Follow up question, how often 
do you send money? Where do you send the money? Who are the recipients? Does 
remittance affect your economic wellbeing? 
10. Do you have any plans of going back to Eritrea in the future? If yes why, if no why not? 
 
 
NB. This is a semi-structured interview; it does not mean every informant was asked the 
same question.  
 
